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The Societas Privata Europaea - 
A European Private Limited Company in the Making 
 
including a comparative look at the process of company law reform in South Africa 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
European as well as South African company law is in flux. This mini-thesis 
analyses a particular European legislative project, the Statute on a pan-European 
private limited liability company. In addition to that, it provides an overview of the 
ongoing reform of company law in South Africa and more briefly seeks to relate 
these findings to the European project.  
A. The European Private Company project 
European company law has been experiencing rapid development in recent 
years. On 8 October 2004 a controversial European legislation entered into 
force that laid the legal foundations for a European public limited liability 
company, the so called Societas Europaea (SE). The SE, designed to 
enhance the global competitiveness and business of large European 
enterprises and groups of companies, was a necessary and important step 
towards the modernization and harmonization of European company law. It is 
widely agreed that European small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs)1  
conducting cross-border business are likewise in need of a legal company 
form designed to match their specific requirements. The SE will therefore not 
be the last company type to be regulated on a European level.  
 
Since the late 1990’s a European private limited liability company has been a 
topic of discussion and deliberation among academics, legal practitioners and 
the business community alike. The European private limited company is 
deemed to be of high relevance for the further development of the European 
Internal market and of what is generally considered its backbone: the small 
                                            
1
 In French: petites et moyennes enterprises (PME); in German: kleine und mittlere Unternehmen 
(KMU) 
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and medium-sized enterprises conducting cross-border business within it. The 
fact that small businesses generally make an important contribution to overall 
economic growth and regional development is widely and generally 
acknowledged, in South Africa2 as well as in Europe.  
 
However, European small and medium-sized enterprises still face significant 
problems with regards to their cross-border business in the Internal Market. 
Their difficulties are mostly related to high entry thresholds to other European 
countries. Costs, legal barriers and complex bureaucracy are only a few of the 
difficulties small and medium-sized enterprises face in setting up and running 
business in European Union Member States other than their own. The 
diversity and complexity of company law frameworks and regimes in the 
European Union are generally perceived to be the most significant sources of 
legal and practical uncertainty for businesses.3 The existing pan-European 
public limited European Company (SE), designed for large companies, does 
not constitute a viable option for small and medium-sized businesses, in 
particular because of its minimum capital requirement of 120.000 Euros.  
 
In 2004, the European Commission therefore financed and published a 
“Feasibility Study for a European Statute of SMEs”4 essentially referring to a 
new and uniform type of European private limited liability company, the 
European Private Company (EPC). Similar to the already existing public 
limited liability company (SE), the future European Private Company is also 
referred to by its Latin name: Societas Privata Europaea (SPE). The 
Commission’s feasibility study paved the way for a legislative process 
regarding the future Statute for a European Private Company (EPC Statute).  
 
In 2005 the EPC was officially included as a discussion topic in the European 
Commission’s “Consultation and Hearing on Future Priorities for the Action 
Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in 
the European Union”.5 At about the same time, in 2006, the European 
                                            
2
 Henning, Journal for Juridical Science, 28(2), p. 2 
3
 Schunk, Presentation at the European Commission’s 2008 Conference 
4
 For a summarized overview of the study: European Commission, 2005 Feasibility Study, Executive 
Summary 
5
 European Commission, 2005 Consultation Document 
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Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs held a public hearing6 on the EPC’s 
necessity, advantages and drawbacks. On the basis of this, the European 
Parliament adopted a Resolution in February 20077 requesting the European 
Commission to draw up a draft EPC Statute during that same year. Detailed 
recommendations on the possible content of such Statute were annexed to the 
resolution.  
 
Starting in July 2007 the European Commission held another more specific 
public consultation among small and medium-sized businesses (“Consultation 
on a possible statute for a European Private Company (EPC)”)8 in order to 
assess the necessary practical and legal scope of a possible Statute. The 
2007 Consultation was based on a detailed questionnaire developed for this 
purpose and forms part of the ongoing hands-on legislative impact 
assessment process which aims to verify the cost-benefit relation of the 
envisioned project. Its results were published in December 20079 and could 
not be misread: the majority of small and medium-sized businesses shared the 
majority view of academics and legal practitioners and considered that the 
EPC statute was a necessary step to take. 
B. South African corporate law developments 
Similar to European corporate law, South African corporate law is in a state of 
development and restructuring. In May 2004, the South African Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) published a study entitled “South African Company 
Law for the 21st Century - Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform”.10 The paper 
suggested a series of amendments to the South African regulatory framework 
for companies, notably the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (still largely based on 
English law) and the Close Corporation Act 69 of 1984. The overall aim is to 
simplify the law in order to enhance the growth of South African enterprises. In 
February 2007, a Draft Companies Bill was issued. It was announced that it 
would be passed in Parliament during 2008. Among the overall issues 
contemplated by the Companies Bill 2007 are the director’s duties, the board 
                                            
6
 European Parliament, 2006 Hearing 
7
 European Parliament, 2007 Resolution 
8
 European Commission, 2007 Consultation, Questionnaire 
9
 European Commission, 2007 Consultation, Summary Report 
10
 South African Government Gazette 26493, notice 1183, 23 June 2004 
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structure, the introduction of a so-called closely held company, the single 
business entity, capital maintenance, shareholder and investor protection, as 
well as mergers and takeovers. This list of issues reveals certain parallels and 
overlapping with the European efforts. 
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II. Motivation, method and structure of the investigation 
 
A. Problem statement / motivation of the investigation 
It is by now widely acknowledged that there is a need for the European Private 
Company. However, although the European Parliament had requested the 
European Commission to put forward a draft Statute during 2007,11 the 
Commission is currently (May 2008) only at the beginning of the drafting 
process and thus far behind schedule. European lawmakers, legal 
practitioners, lobbyists and academics are still busy collecting and discussing 
thoughts on what the EPC Statute should ideally look like. The discussion and 
consequently the potential content of such Statute are still very fragmented 
and in a remarkably underdeveloped state. Neither the teleological 
requirements, nor the content of the legal framework to be developed have 
been identified clearly and comprehensively12. Questions, such as the overall 
aim and structure of the EPC, its uniform rules and respectively applicable 
national laws as well as all the details of its content remain unanswered. The 
EPC Statute, therefore, is still a vague idea, a first collection of issues, rather 
than a clear legal project.  
 
This mini-thesis aims to contribute to the debate around the legislative process 
by summarizing and analysing it comprehensively. It will, without being 
exhaustive, seek to identify the most important legal requirements that the 
future Statute needs to meet in order to facilitate cross-border business of 
small and medium-sized businesses. It seeks to systematise and comment on 
the most important legal Key Issues and therefore clarify and enrich the 
debate. The mini-thesis will not, however, question the necessity of the EPC 
itself, or examine whether the legislation of a Statute at this point in time is 
premature or whether other ways would be more feasible to enhance the 
cross-border business of small and medium-sized businesses in Europe.13 It  
                                            
11
 European Parliament, 2007 Resolution, lit. H.1 
12
 See also: German Association of Notaries, Response to the European Commission’s 2007 
Consultation 
13
 For an overview of doubts and alternative approaches see: de Kluiver, Presentation at the European 
Commission’s 2008 Conference 
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simply acknowledges the fact that the EPC is necessary and that the EPC 
Statute will be legislated. The research problem can be formulated as follows:  
 
“What is the necessary legal content of the Statute for a European 
Private Company in order for it to facilitate the conduct of 
business in the European Internal Market for small and medium-
sized enterprises?” 
 
B. The method of the investigation  
1. European perspective 
In order to provide a solution to the research problem, the mini-thesis will 
firstly investigate the EPC Statute’s teleology and define its main purpose 
and objectives from a purely European perspective. On those grounds it 
will identify and systematize the most important legal issues regarding the 
scope, structure and content of the future Statute. The legal cornerstones 
to be regulated by the EPC Statute will be called “Key Issues” for the 
purpose of this investigation. The Key Issues will be grouped topically in 
different Key Issue groups (e.g.: legal issues regarding the EPC’s share 
capital will be grouped under the title “Share Capital” as follows: minimum 
legal capital, shareholder contributions, shares and share classes, share 
transfer, transfer restrictions and pre-emption rights).  
 
This mini-thesis will subsequently discuss and assess the EPC Statute’s 
necessary scope and content regarding each Key Issue. It will explore 
some of the important Key Issues in more detail, again without being 
exhaustive. Other Key Issues of less importance will be touched upon 
briefly. The assessment will take into account not only the Statute’s 
identified teleology and positions from the different players involved in the 
public debate, but also generally applicable concepts of company law, 
economical and practical business factors. It will further seek to take into 
account any potentially reciprocal effects of any Key Issue on other Key 
Issues.  
 
The investigation will be carried out by analysing legal literature and official 
policy documents on the matter. This notably includes the European 
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Commission’s findings in its two public consultations regarding the EPC14 
as well as the numerous responses to those consultations as provided by 
lobbying groups and small and medium-sized enterprises. Another 
important source of information will be the first draft for an EPC Statute by 
the Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry from 1997.15 The reviewed 
literature will form the basis for developing an appropriate solution to the 
research problem. The amount of available literature is, however, 
somewhat limited. The assessment of necessary solutions will therefore 
be partly based on general legal reasoning and the author’s limited 
practical experience. The expected findings of this mini-thesis should 
serve as a possible indication for the drafting of the EPC Statute. 
2. South African perspective 
In addition to the European investigation, the mini-thesis includes a brief 
examination of the parallels between the European and South African 
debates regarding corporate law reform legislation. Thereby it seeks to 
broaden the investigation’s perspective and give a different connotation 
and fresh ideas to both, the European and South African debates.  
C.  Structure and basic outline of the investigation 
This mini-thesis is essentially structured in the following way: 
 
• Topical and historical overviews 
In Chapter III. the mini-thesis will provide overviews of the most 
important topical and historical facts regarding pan-European and 
South African company law and respective legislative projects. This 
will include: 
 
 a short introduction to the existing company law framework on 
European Community level, including notably the European 
Court of Justice’s jurisdiction and the existing Statute on a 
Societas Europaea (SE), 
 
 a historical overview of the legislative process regarding the 
EPC Statute, from its origins in 1954 up to the European 
Commission’s latest announcement to put forward a first draft of 
the EPC Statute in 2008, 
 
 a brief topical overview of South African company law 
                                            
14
 European Commission, 2005 Consultation and 2007 Consultation 
15
 Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIP), 1997 Study on the EPC, Explanatory 
Memorandum and Draft Articles 
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 a summary of the envisioned overhaul of South African 
company law 
 
• In depth analysis of the European project 
 
 Teleology of the EPC Statute 
In Chapter IV. the investigation will identify the EPC’s teleology. 
The result will be an overview of reasons and deliberations why 
the EPC Statute is after all deemed a necessary legislation and 
what social benefits and policies it is supposed to serve. 
 
 Discussion of the European Key Issues 
Chapter V. will, in light of the EPC Statute’s teleology, discuss 
and assess alternative solutions to the Key Issues. It will identify 
and suggest an appropriate solution for each of the Key Issues in 
each of the Key Issue Groups. 
 
• Relations between the projects in Europe and in South Africa 
In Chapter VI., the mini-thesis will seek to answer the question: what 
can European lawmakers learn from the South African reform 
project when drafting the EPC Statute. It will relate the planned 
South African reform project to the European project. 
 
• Conclusion 
In Chapter VII. the overall and most basic conclusions of the 
investigation will be summarized. 
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III. Topical and historical overviews 
 
 
This Chapter provides an overview of the most important topical and historical facts 
regarding pan-European and South African company law against the background of 
the respective legislative projects. This includes a summary of the envisioned South 
African company law reform. The information in this Chapter is the basis for an in-
depth analysis of the European project to be conducted in Chapters IV. and V. and 
the subsequent relation of the findings to the South African project in Chapter VI. 
A. Overview of the European Community corporate law framework 
1. Current structure 
A large number of forms of companies are trading in the European Union 
all of which are subject to very different national regulations. European 
Law tries to cope with the diversity of national company laws on three 
levels. Firstly, Articles 43 and 48 of the Treaty on the European 
Community (EC-Treaty) together with the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice provide for mutual recognition and corporate mobility (see 
below a)). Secondly, European lawmakers are permanently busy 
harmonizing the most important fields of national corporate law, notably by 
means of Directives that have to be implemented in the Member States 
(see below b)). Thirdly, European lawmakers work on the establishment of 
pan-European company forms, such as the European Company (SE) and 
the European Private Company (see below c)). 
a) Mutual recognition and European mobility of companies 
A particular company from one Member State of the European Union 
that plans to conduct business in another Member State is depending 
on recognition of its legal form in the foreign host Member State. As a 
rule according to the Treaty on the European Community (EC-Treaty), 
there should be mutual recognition of all kinds of types of companies 
throughout the Union, resulting in complete corporate freedom of 
movement and establishment. The cornerstones of the legal 
framework for that can be described as follows:  
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i) The freedom of establishment of Articles 43 and 48 EC-Treaty 
In order to establish the European Internal Market and the 
freedom of movement of natural and legal persons as well as 
companies, Articles 43 and 48 of the EC-Treaty provide for 
general and multilateral recognition of national company forms in 
all other Member States:  
 
“Article 43 
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of 
a Member State in the territory of another Member State 
shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to 
restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or 
subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established 
in the territory of any Member State. Freedom of 
establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue 
activities as self-employed persons and to set up and 
manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms 
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48, 
under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the 
law of the country where such establishment is effected, 
subject to the provisions of the chapter relating to capital. 
 […] 
Article 48 
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of 
a Member State and having their registered office, central 
administration or principal place of business within the 
Community shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be 
treated in the same way as natural persons who are 
nationals of Member States. "Companies or firms" means 
companies or firms constituted under civil or commercial 
law, including cooperative societies, and other legal 
persons governed by public or private law, save for those 
which are non-profit-making.” 
 
The freedom of establishment of companies and the application 
and interpretation of these provisions in the Member States of 
the European Union gave rise to a number of legal problems that 
were brought in front of the European Court of Justice. There are 
three landmark cases decided by the European Court of Justice 
which thereby actively got involved in the development of 
European company law: the Centros case, the Überseering case, 
and the Inspire Art case:  
 
 
 
 
 16 
ii) The problem of the pseudo-foreign company (Centros case) 
In 1998 the Court ruled on the problem of the so-called 
pseudo-foreign company (as opposed to a real foreign 
company).16 A real foreign company is incorporated and 
conducting business in one Member State (its home jurisdiction) 
and at the same conducts business (with or without a registered 
branch) in another Member State (the host jurisdiction) on 
grounds of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC-Treaty. A pseudo-foreign 
company is a company incorporated in one Member State 
without conducting business there, but instead trading 
exclusively in another Member State. Pseudo-foreign companies 
are usually used to avoid strict company law requirements in the 
host country by fulfilling the more relaxed requirements of the 
home jurisdiction. For example an English Private Limited 
Company requires no minimum capital even if it conducts 
business in Germany, whereas the domestic German private 
limited (GmbH) would currently require a minimum legal capital 
of € 25.000.  
 
Until 1998 there was significant uncertainty in and dispute over 
the question of whether such “legal-form-tourism” was an abuse 
of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC-Treaty. The European Court of 
Justice ruled in the Centros case and later on several occasions 
with different legal connotations that pseudo-foreign companies 
were perfectly consistent with European Law. In essence the 
Court had to decide the case of the English Limited “Centros” 
that had been refused incorporation in Denmark on grounds of 
the argument that the use of the UK Limited, which required no 
minimum capital, was not meeting the Danish regime for creditor 
protection. The Court refused the Danish position arguing that 
establishing a pseudo-foreign company meant not abusing but 
using the freedom of establishment.  
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iii) The problem of the real seat (Überseering case) 
In 2002, the European Court of Justice decided on a case 
regarding the transfer of seat of foreign companies, the so-called 
Überseering case.17 A German court had ruled that the sale of 
shares in the Dutch company Überseering B.V. to new owners 
living and managing the company in Germany had lead to a 
transfer of its real seat to Germany. The court concluded in 
application of the so-called seat doctrine that the company had 
legally collapsed the moment its real seat was transferred and 
had therefore no capacity to sue. The German Federal Supreme 
Court referred the case to the European Court of Justice which 
decided that any company established under the laws of a 
Member State must be accepted by all other Member States as 
such, regardless of its real set. The Court thereby essentially 
discarded the real seat doctrine. 
iv) The problem of defence legislation (Inspire Art case) 
The next significant case regarding the establishment of foreign 
companies, the so-called Inspire Art case, was decided in 
2003.18 In this case the Court clarified that no national legal 
requirements must be superimposed on foreign and pseudo-
foreign companies.19 The case concerned Dutch defence 
legislation meant to defend the requirement of a minimum legal 
capital in the Netherlands against circumvention, by means of an 
obligation to disclose a company’s pseudo-foreign character. The 
Court decided that the Dutch defence legislation was inconsistent 
with the Eleventh European Company Law Directive dealing with 
disclosure requirements for branches. 
b) Legislative harmonization efforts 
The legislative harmonization of national company laws on a 
European level is being achieved by means of a series of Directives. 
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Apart from rare exceptions the process of harmonisation only 
concerns public limited companies.20 The most important harmonizing 
Company Law Directives are: 
 
• the First Directive (enacted in 1968)21 harmonized the 
mandatory disclosures of company data, such as the 
disclosure of the articles, the board members and their power 
to bind the company, the disclosure of the annual accounts 
etc.; 
• the Second Directive (1976) 22 introduced capital raising and 
maintenance provisions for public companies; 
• the Third Directive (1978)23 provided for standard rules for the 
merger of public companies; 
• the Fourth Directive (1978)24 regulated common rules for the 
annual accounts of companies and was modified in 2001; 
• the Fifth Directive, which was going to harmonize company 
structures failed for political reasons; 
• the Sixth Directive (1982)25 regulated the division of public 
companies; 
• the Seventh Directive (1983)26 brought rules for the 
consolidation of group accounts and was modified in 2001;  
• the Eighth Directive (1984)27 harmonized the qualification  and 
liability of auditors; 
• the IAS Regulation (2002)28 obliged all listed companies to 
submit their annual accounts according to the International 
Accounting Standards (IAS/IFRS); 
• the Tenth Directive (2003)29 provided for a regime on cross-
border mergers of companies with limited liability (public and 
private); 
• the Eleventh Directive (1989)30 stipulated common disclosure 
requirements for branches of foreign companies; 
• the Twelfth Directive (1989)31 obliged all Member States to 
recognize single-member companies; 
• the so-called Thirteenth Directive (2004)32provided for common 
requirements for takeover bids; 
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28
 EC-Regulation 1606/2002 
29
 Directive COM (2003) 703(01) 
30
 Eleventh Council Directive 89/666/EEC 
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• the European Insolvency Regulation (2002)33 provided for a 
very limited harmonization of the cornerstones of company 
insolvency; 
• moreover, a Fourteenth Company Law Directive on cross-
border seat transfers is in the making.34 
 
This list of Directives illustrates that European harmonization legislation 
is still an incomplete patchwork of a minimum of harmonizing 
regulations.35 
c) Pan-European company forms 
i) Overview 
There are essentially three existing pan-European structures 
available to business ventures in the European Union: 
 
• the European Economic Interest Group (EEIG), 
• the European Cooperative Society (SCE),  
• and the European Company or Societas Europaea (SE). 
 
Only the European Company (SE) is of significant practical 
relevance and shall be described in more detail:  
ii) The European Company or Societas Europaea (SE) 
The European Regulation on the Statute for a European 
Company36 entered into force on 8 March 2004. The Societas 
Europaea (SE) was designed, just like the European Private 
Company will be, as a uniform legal form to minimize the adverse 
effect that 27 different company law systems have on cross-
border business.37 Just like the EPC is going to be, the SE is 
governed by a more or less uniform set of rules throughout the 
European Union. Unlike the EPC, which is going to be a private 
limited company addressing the needs of small and medium-
sized businesses, the SE is a public limited company addressing 
the needs of larger companies and groups of companies. The 
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 EC-Regulation 1346/2000 
34
 see: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/seat-transfer/index_en.htm  
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 For an overview of remaining gaps see: Schall, p. 22  
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SE’s legal key features and its practical relevance can be 
described as follows: 
(a) The SE’s basic legal features 
The SE cannot be set up by a natural person, but only by 
one or more public and/or private limited companies 
according to a very limited catalogue of possible ways of 
formation, including mergers and transformations. An SE 
must have its registered office and its administrative head 
office, but not necessarily all its commercial activities, in a 
single Member State. The SE will be allowed to operate in 
other Member States than its own in a way comparable to 
a branch but without the necessity to register as such. The 
minimum subscribed capital is € 120.000, subject to 
possible stricter requirements in certain Member States. 
The founding members can opt for a one-tier management 
system (administrative board only) or a two-tier system 
(supervisory and management boards). The tax law of the 
Member State where the SE is registered, tax resident or 
in which it has a taxable presence applies. 
(b) The SE in practice 
As of March 2007 about 70 SEs have been incorporated 
and another 20 were in the phase of incorporation, some 
of them mere “shell-companies”.38 Among the few 
incorporated SEs are some very large groups of 
companies, such as the German “Allianz SE”.39 
2. History and status quo of the EPC project 
The following is an overview of the EPC’s historical developments. The 
early beginnings are obviously intertwined with the history of the SE, as 
public and private limited liability companies were discussed under the 
common umbrella term of “pan-European company”: 
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a) Origins 
The idea of a pan-European company originated among French 
notaries as early as 1959. Initially proposed on political level by the 
European Commission in 1970, and amended in 1989 – 1991, the 
European Company, private as well as public, was discussed over 
and over again with varying intensity for more than 30 years, without 
any significant results. 
b) MEDEF / Paris Chamber of Commerce 1997 Study 
The first in-depth investigation of the possibility of an EPC was 
conducted by the Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF, the 
French Business Confederation) and the Chambre de Commerce et 
d’Industrie de Paris (CCIP, the Paris Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry) in 1997.40 MEDEF and the Chamber published a study 
entitled “The European Private Company” on a company statute for 
small and medium-sized enterprises and suggested a pan-European 
business structure appropriate for the latter. The study already 
included an early draft proposal for the statute (the only one up until 
today) and intensified the current academic as well as legal policy 
debate on the matter.41 
c) European Charter for Small Enterprises 2000 
The European Charter for Small Enterprises, adopted by the General 
Affairs Council in Lisbon on 13 June 2000 and endorsed at the Feira 
European Council Meeting on 19-20 June 2000, pointed out that small 
businesses form the “backbone” of Europe’s economy and are the key 
to its competitiveness especially in the drive to make Europe a 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy.42 
d) European Statute on the European Company (SE) 
After a lengthy legislative process the statute for the first pan-
European company, the public limited SE aiming at large companies 
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and groups of companies, was adopted in October 2001 (see above 
for details). The statute entered into force on 8 March 2004. 
e) The European Commission’s 2003 Action Plan 
The further development of the idea of a European Private Company 
was slow. On 21 May 2003, the European Commission published an 
Action Plan entitled “Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament: Modernising Company Law 
and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A 
Plan to Move Forward”43. This Action Plan, to be implemented 
successively over the next years, was not focussed on the EPC at all, 
but it included first official comments on the matter of a European 
private limited. It is important to note that it was not a piece of 
legislation, but a mere policy paper pointing in a certain direction and 
giving new impetus. The Action Plan 2003 Report reads:44 
 
“[…] the Societas Europaea (SE), adopted in October 2001, may 
not meet all expectations of the business community, in particular 
SMEs […]” 
 
 and referred to the development,  
 
“[…] of a "European Private Company" (EPC) which, as a new 
legal form at EU level, would primarily serve the needs of SMEs 
which are active in more than one Member State. […] The 
Commission will therefore launch a feasibility study in the short 
term, with a view to presenting a proposal for an EPC statute (if 
the feasibility study confirms the need for such an initiative) in the 
medium term. The aim of this feasibility study is to evaluate the 
advantages and the problems generated by a possible European 
legal statute for small and medium enterprises in order to 
facilitate their internationalisation. To this end, the study should 
conduct an in-depth analysis of the legal, tax and social policy 
regimes relevant to SMEs in the [then still] 25 Member States of 
the enlarged Union.” 
f) The European Commission’s 2004 Feasibility Study 
In 2004 / 2005, the European Commission launched, financed and 
published the said “Feasibility Study for a European Statute of 
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SMEs”45. The results were presented on 13 December 2005. The 
executive summary points out the following: 
 
“The enterprises wish for a legal medium which will enable them 
to carry out ambitious projects, at both national and inter-
European level: to grow and to secure their position. The SMEs 
questioned in the context of this study express to equal extents 
their points of view on the nature and importance of the legal, 
administrative and tax problems, as well as their concerns 
concerning the obstacles to their establishment abroad. It 
appears that the need for a new statute, where it exists, is 
justified above all by the will to have a flexible legal medium, 
independent of the European dimension or tendency of the 
SMEs.” 
g) The European Commission’s 2005 Consultation 
From December 2005 to 31 March 2006, as the first phase of 
implementation of the 2003 Action Plan was coming to an end, the 
European Commission held a public consultation46 on the future of the 
Company Law and Corporate Governance Action Plan 2003. The 
addressees’ backgrounds were diverse with 30% industry, 11% 
investors, 18% public authorities, 8% financial intermediaries, 7% 
trade-unions, 5% academics, 21% others. The consultation included a 
question number 12 on the necessity for an EPC:47 
 
“Do you see value in developing an EPC Statute in addition to 
the existing European (e.g. Societas Europaea, European 
Interest Grouping) and national legal forms? Please give your 
reasons. If so, are there, in your view, specific elements which 
any such statute should cover?”  
 
The results of the consultation regarding the EPC were not multi-
faceted48 and reflected the respondents’ different backgrounds. 
Nevertheless, overall the new approach received considerable 
support. The Summary Report found:  
 
“Whilst underlining the current ‘regulatory fatigue’ and calling for 
a ‘digestion/stabilisation period’, a number of respondents 
pleaded for the adoption of enabling legislation (i.e. a proposal 
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for a Directive on the transfer of registered office, a European 
Private Company Statute)49. […] A strong majority of the 
respondents (63,9%) was in favour of a possible proposal for a 
European Company Statute (EPC) as a tool providing 
advantages especially to the private companies, which may not 
be able to benefit of the European Company Statute. […] An 
EPC Statute would ensure legal certainty by providing a uniform 
legal framework for a European corporate form and guarantee 
that the same set of rules would apply to companies operating 
cross-border. This would significantly reduce compliance costs 
and, therefore, enhance the mobility and competitiveness of the 
European SMEs. A number of respondents stressed the 
importance of the Statute for the companies aiming to set up joint 
ventures or operate a network of subsidiaries in different Member 
States. The possibility to do business across EU under one 
‘European label’ was also mentioned as an important advantage 
for the marketing reasons and integration in the internal market, 
especially of the companies with less known legal forms (e.g. 
from the new Member States). A minority of the opponents 
(25,2%) mentioned the lack of interest in the industry in such 
corporate form.”50 
h) The European Parliament’s 2006 Hearing 
On 22 June 2006 the European Parliament’s Committee of Legal 
Affairs held a public expert hearing on a possible EPC.51 The experts 
included a member of the legal committee of the Union of Industrial 
and Employers’ Confederation of Europe (UNICE), several academics 
from Queen Mary University in London, the University of Bologna, the 
University of Heidelberg, as well as in-house and private practice 
corporate lawyers and a representative of the Dutch Trade Unions’ 
Confederation. The Hearing underscored the need for a European 
Private Company as a legal form for small and medium-sized 
undertakings engaged in cross-border business. 
i) The European Parliament’s 2006 Report 
On grounds of these findings, the Parliament’s Committee of Legal 
Affairs drafted an own-initiative report52 and a resolution on the issue 
together with recommendations on the possible content of the 
EPC Statute. The report was published on 29 November 2006. 
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j) The European Parliament’s 2007 Resolution 
It was only in 2007, however, when plans seriously picked up pace. 
On 1 February 2007, the European Parliament held another hearing 
on the EPC and subsequently adopted the aforementioned 
resolution53 including an annex with detailed recommendations, 
requesting that the European Commission draw up a uniform statute 
for the new company type to submit to Parliament on the basis of 
Article 308 of the EC-Treaty during 2007.54 It must be pointed out that 
with regard to the European Parliament’s very peculiar standing 
among European institutions55 this resolution on the EPC has no 
legislative effect but is rather to be considered as a mere political 
statement or initiative of no binding effect. 
k) The European Commission’s 2007 Consultation 
The European Commission analysed the Parliament’s report and 
recommendations and defined several topics that needed to be tested 
with the market in order to collect the facts and evidence needed for a 
legislative proposal regarding the EPC Statute. Therefore, in July 
2007, the European Commission launched another public 
consultation, this time specifically designed with regards to the EPC, 
including a questionnaire on the problems small and medium-sized 
businesses face in their cross-border and activities.56 The 
Commission asked notably entrepreneurs and policy-making groups 
for their opinions on what the EPC Statute should ideally look like. 
Among the 75 respondents from 11 Member States were 26% 
business associations (each representing large groups of 
businesses), 23% groups of companies, 23% professional service 
providers (lawyers, notaries, accountants), 19% individual small and 
medium-sized businesses, 3% trade unions, 3% public authorities and 
3% others. The vast majority of responses came from France (22), 
Germany (13) and Austria (10). The results of the Consultation were 
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published in December 200757. Regarding the obstacles business 
face in cross-border activities the Commission summarises: 
 
“A majority of respondents consider that they face obstacles 
related to the legal form of companies when doing business in 
other Member States. The diversity of company law forms and 
regimes in the EU is perceived as a significant source of costs 
and legal uncertainty. Respondents also consider the existing 
legal framework as insufficient for cross-border activity and would 
welcome a statute for a European private company (SPE). In 
addition to providing a European label which many respondents 
would find helpful as a marketing tool in a global environment, 
the SPE would allow significant cost savings by enabling the use 
of the same legal form in several Member States. As a matter of 
fact, a majority of respondents would prefer setting up a new 
business as a SPE rather than use a national company legal 
form.”58 
l) The European Commission’s October 2007 announcement 
At the European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee on 3 October 
2007, Internal Markets and Services Commissioner Charlie McCreevy 
announced his intention to present a proposal on the EPC Statute by 
mid-2008 at the latest.59 As of 6 May 2008 no proposal has been 
published. 
m) The European Business Test Panel Survey 2007 
Parallel to the official institutional procedures, a survey by the so-
called the European Business Test Panel among European 
companies entitled “European Survey on European Private Company” 
was available in all official EU languages from 3 October 2007 until 
5 November 2007. It received 517 responses from diverse industries. 
The majority of respondents deemed the EPC necessary for their 
activities.60 
n) The European Commission’s conference on 10 March 2008 
On 10 March 2008, the European Commission held a high-profile 
conference on how to best pave the way towards a Commission 
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proposal on a statute for the EPC.61 The conference’s goal was to 
sound out expert opinion on the subject. Approximately 120 
participants from 24 Member States and from all kinds of stake-
holding backgrounds (including entrepreneurs, public officials, policy-
makers and academics) attended the conference. The list of expert 
panel speakers, whose opinions this mini-thesis partly draws upon, 
reads as follows: 
 
• Brane Matjasec, Director General for the Internal Market, 
Government of Slovenia, 
• Kristina Schunk, Company Lawyer, Schunk GmbH & Co., 
Germany, 
• José Furtado, Portuguese Institute for SMEs and Innovation 
(IAPMEI), 
• Joëlle Simon, Director for Legal Affairs, French Business 
Confederation (MEDEF), 
• Leena Linnainmaa, Central Chamber of Commerce, Finland  
• Christoph Teichmann, Professor of Company and Commercial 
Law, University of Würzburg, Germany,  
• Harm-Jan de Kluiver, Professor of Corporate Law, University of 
Amsterdam, Netherlands, 
• Robert Drury, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter, UK, 
• András Hanák, Attorney-at-Law, Budapest, Hungary 
• Janet Dine, Professor in Commercial Law Studies, University of 
London, UK, 
• Theodor Baums, Director of the Institute for Banking Law, 
Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 
• Miroslaw Cejmer, Attorney at Law, Cracow, Poland,  
• Ioan Dumitrascu, Attorney-at-Law, Bucharest, Rumania,  
• Vanessa Knapp, Private Practice Lawyer, Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer 
• Guido Ferrarini, Professor in Business and Capital Markets 
Law, University of Genoa, Italy,  
• Reiner Hoffmann, European Trade Union Confederation, 
• Jörgen Holmquist, Director-General for the Internal Market and 
Services, European Commission. 
 
The results of the conference held on 10 March 2008 are currently 
being analysed by the European Commission and will be taken into 
account in the preparation of a draft proposal for the EPC Statute. 
o) Outlook 
As said before, a first draft proposal is announced for mid-2008. 
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B. South African corporate law and reform overview 
This part of the mini-thesis seeks to give a basic overview of existing corporate 
law regulation in South Africa and it will explain the ongoing reform process.  
1. Basics of South African company law 
South African companies have the typical structure of common-law 
corporations: legal personality, perpetual succession and limited liability. 
They are essentially partnerships of which the shareholders are partners, 
although their juristic nature is very different62. Companies are legal 
persons entirely distinct from the shareholders who own and compose it 
(legal personality). The company can acquire rights and duties in its own 
name. Unlike in a partnership, in a company a change in the membership 
does not have the effect of terminating the entity (perpetual succession). 
As a rule, the liability of shareholders of a company is limited to either the 
amount unpaid on shares held by them, or to such amount as the 
members agreed to pay in case the company needs to be wound up 
(limited liability). A member’s interest in the company is equivalent to the 
number of shares the particular member owns in the company. Generally, 
the share capital of a company may be divided into shares with a par value 
(with an indicator of its value) or shares with no par value (no indicator of 
its value)63. As a rule, members of a company may freely transfer their 
shares, except where the transfer is restricted by the articles.  
 
The founding of a company has to be registered with the Registrar of 
Companies in Pretoria, comprising two documents: the memorandum of 
incorporation (governing the company’s external affairs) and the articles of 
association (governing the company’s internal affairs). The most important 
organs of a company are the general meeting of members, and the 
directorate (board of directors). A company acts through its directors who 
in turn act on grounds of the respective memorandum and articles of 
association.  
                                            
62 Gibson, p. 259 
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2. Types of companies and corporations in South Africa  
The most common and important corporate structures currently provided 
by South African corporate law for business ventures are the limited 
company and, to a less significant extent, the close corporation. The most 
important sources of corporate law are, therefore, the South African 
Companies Act 61 of 1973, still largely based on English law, and the 
Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984, both as amended. However, in some 
areas, notably in the area of directors’ duties, common law is still a 
significant source.64 With regard to this mini-thesis’ limited comparative 
scope, further discussion is restricted to the abovementioned forms and 
will not look at non-corporate forms, such as the sole proprietorship or the 
partnership, or at less common corporate forms, such as the business 
trust or the co-operative society.  
a) Companies under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
The Companies Act 61 of 1973 allows for the incorporation of two 
basic types of companies: a company with a share capital, and a 
company limited by guarantee (s 19 (1)). Companies with a share 
capital may be either public or private in nature (s 19 (2)).  
i) Companies with a share capital 
The liability of shareholders of a company with a share capital is 
restricted to the respective member’s unpaid (if any) share in the 
company’s share capital. There are currently public companies 
with a share capital and private companies with a share capital: 
(a) Public companies with a share capital 
The public company with a share capital is the basic 
corporate structure provided by the Companies Act 61 of 
1973. It must have at least seven members with the 
shares usually freely transferable. Shares may be (but are 
not necessarily) listed on a stock exchange. The name of 
a public company with a share capital always includes the 
word “Limited” (Ltd). Public companies must have a 
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company secretary, responsible, amongst other things, for 
guiding the directors with regard to their duties and 
ensuring proper documentation of the company’s conduct 
of business as well as other housekeeping duties. 
(b) Private companies with a share capital 
A private company with a share capital is a company 
which by its articles restricts the right to transfer its shares. 
It limits the number of its members to fifty and prohibits 
any offer to the public for the subscription of any shares or 
debentures of the company (s 20 (1)). Private companies 
are exempt from many legal provisions governing public 
companies, making the private company a simpler and 
more easily manageable type of business structure. The 
name of a private company with a share capital always 
includes the words “Proprietary Limited” ((Pty) Ltd). It is 
possible to stipulate in the company’s memorandum of 
association that the directors and past directors of a 
private company would be liable jointly and severally with 
the company for debts incurred during their activity. In that 
case the name of the private company includes the word 
“Incorporated” (Inc), instead of “Proprietary Limited”.  
ii) Companies limited by guarantee 
A company limited by guarantee does not have a share capital, 
but its memorandum of association limits the shareholders’ 
liability to a certain amount of money which each shareholder 
must contribute in the event of winding up (s 52 (3)). All 
Companies limited by guarantee are public companies by 
definition. The official name of such company always includes 
the words “Limited by Guarantee”. 
b) Close corporations 
In addition to the said companies, the South African Close 
Corporations Act 69 of 1984 provides for the Close Corporation as 
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another form of corporate body with limited liability. The Close 
Corporation is very similar to the private company under the 
Companies Act.65 However, its legal structure is even simpler, it is 
governed by more relaxed legal provisions and it is less rigidly 
controlled.66 The Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 was legislated in 
order to enhance the business of small and medium-sized enterprises 
in South Africa by providing a less expensive and more flexible legal 
form.67 A close corporation has characteristics of both a partnership 
and a company.68 The close corporation has legal personality and the 
principle of perpetual succession applies. The number of members of 
a close corporation may not exceed ten and the members may 
exclusively be natural persons, not legal persons. In connection with 
incorporation, every founding member must make an initial 
contribution of money, property or services rendered. In turn, the 
member receives a certificate signed by or on behalf of every member 
confirming the percentage of that particular member’s interest in the 
corporation. Apart from their contribution, the members are not liable 
for the corporation’s liabilities. As a rule, every member has the right 
to participate in the management of the corporation and equal rights in 
the power to represent. The power to bind the corporation is governed 
by the law of agency and the doctrine of ultra vires69 is not applicable. 
The official name of a close corporation always includes the acronym 
“CC”. 
3. In particular: powers and duties of company directors 
The current regime of directors’ fiduciary duties in South Africa is under 
particular scrutiny in the process of reform of South African corporate law 
(see below for details of the reform process). The current law can be 
summarized as follows: 
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a) Basics 
The powers and duties of directors are governed by the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973, by common law principles,70 by the director’s contracts 
with the company, and finally by the company’s constitution. Public 
companies must have at least two directors, and private companies at 
least one director (s 208 (1)). The directors collectively form the board 
of directors. According to common-law practice directors owe fiduciary 
duties and obligations of care and skill to the company. 
b) Appointment and qualification 
Directors are appointed by the subscribers of the memorandum of 
association (s 209), unless the articles of association provide 
otherwise. The Companies Act 61 of 1973 stipulates a number of 
reasons disqualifying a person from being appointed a director (s 
218). The acts of a director are valid notwithstanding any legal defect 
that may possibly be found in his appointment or qualification (s 214).  
c) Powers and agents 
Usually the articles of association authorize the directors to exercise 
all powers of the company, unless certain powers are explicitly 
required to be exercised by the general meeting. As a rule, the board 
of directors is the company’s agent. Generally, the powers of the 
directors must be exercised by all appointed directors acting together 
in a board meeting, unless the articles provide otherwise, notably for 
the possibility of delegating certain powers to one or more directors. 
The articles can also provide for a managing director with authority to 
perform all or any of the powers of the board; third parties dealing with 
the managing director are then entitled to believe he has the 
authorities he would normally have to bind the company. The 
managing director or any other individual director appointed with 
authority to act on behalf of the company is an agent governed by the 
law of agency.  
                                            
70
 Havenga, General Principles of Commercial Law, p. 293 
 
 
 
 
 33 
d) Good faith and liability 
Any agent of the company, i.e. notably the board or one or more 
individual directors, stands in a fiduciary relationship to it and has the 
typical common-law duties of agents, including the duty to act in 
utmost good faith.71 The essence of this fiduciary obligation is that the 
agent should act bona fide in the interests of the company. This 
entails amongst other things that the director should avoid any conflict 
of interests with the company. Moreover, he must exercise his powers 
for the purpose for which they were conferred upon him. Furthermore, 
the director must not exceed the limits of his powers, i.e. he must not 
conclude transactions which do not fall in the scope of the company’s 
business (ultra vires doctrine) or the director’s own authority. The 
director’s fiduciary duties are binding and any contractual provision 
(notably but not exclusively in the articles) to exempt any director from 
his duties or respective liabilities arising from negligence, default, 
breach of duty or trust, would be void (s 247). This includes provisions 
to indemnify the director against any such liability (s 247).  
e) Directors’ dealings 
An important example of the directors’ duty to act in good faith is that 
an agent cannot, as a rule, enter into transactions that would cause 
his interests and duty to conflict. According to the Companies Act 61 
of 1973 any director who is in any way, directly or indirectly, materially 
interested in contracts or proposed contracts of the company is 
obliged to declare his interest and give full details (ss 234 (1), and 237 
(1), (2)).  
4. The reform of South African Company Law 
South African company law is under scrutiny and a comprehensive reform 
is currently on its way. 
a) Expectations of the reform 
The reform’s “overall aim is to streamline the Companies Act, to bring 
it into line with 21st century legal thinking and practice, thereby 
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ensuring a regulatory framework that will promote growth, innovation, 
stability, good governance, confidence and international 
competitiveness.”72 South African corporate law is expected to 
“undergo a quantum leap, moving to a more sophisticated and 
modern regulatory regime”73 that will be “in line with international 
standards”.74 
b) History, objectives and status quo of the reform 
The reform process was heralded in May 2004 by the South African 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) publishing a study entitled 
“South African Company Law for the 21st Century - Guidelines for 
Corporate Law Reform”.75 The paper, suggesting several significant 
changes to the South African corporate law framework, promised 
“clear, facilitating, predictable and consistently enforced law” and to 
develop a “legal framework based on the principles reflected in the 
Companies Act, 1973, the Close Corporations Act, 1984, and the 
common law.”76 Eventually this approach lead to the issuing of a Draft 
Companies Bill77 which has been open to public comment since early 
2007. The Companies Bill of 2007 will presumably replace the more 
than 34 year-old Companies Act. The draft bill is still subject to 
change, it is, however, envisioned for adoption in Parliament during 
2008. Its main objectives are: simplification, flexibility, corporate 
efficiency, transparency, and predictable regulation. 
c) The reform issues 
The main cornerstones of the proposed Companies Bill 2007 can, 
according to the Department of Trade and Industry’s Explanatory 
Memorandum,78 be summarized as follows: 
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i) Overall structure of the reform 
The suggested Companies Bill 2007 would replace the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973. Many of the Companies Act’s 
provisions, which proved to be functional legislation over the last 
years, would, however, be retained in the new framework. For 
example, the current Companies Act’s provisions on dealing with 
and winding up of insolvent companies would remain unchanged 
for the time being.79  One of the most important aims of the 
reform, according to the Explanatory Memorandum, is the 
promotion of high standards of corporate governance.80 The Bill 
would, moreover, provide for a new simplified regime for forming 
and managing small companies or “closely held companies” 
which was inspired by the provisions in the Close Corporations 
Act 69 of 1984. In the long run the Department of Trade and 
Industry plans to repeal the (redundant) Close Corporation Act, 
which will, however, remain effective as an alternative regime for 
a 10-year experimental period. Only after that period it will be 
decided whether the Close Corporation Act will indeed be 
repealed or needs to be retained indefinitely.81  
ii) Institutional reform 
The Companies Bill 2007 proposes to rearrange regulatory and 
administrative responsibilities of South African state institutions 
regarding all kinds of company law matters.82 The Bill envisions 
the establishment of one new institution, a so-called Companies 
Ombud, as well as the transformation of three existing 
institutions. Under the current Companies Act the responsibilities 
are shared between the Minister of the Department of Trade and 
Industry, the Registrar, the Securities Regulation Panel (SRP),83 
and the Financial Reporting Standards Council (FRSC) as well 
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as the Companies Intellectual Property Registration Office 
(CIPRO, an entity within the Department of Trade and Industry). 
The Companies Bill 2007 proposes to rearrange the 
responsibilities, including some of the Minister’s functions, and 
form an advisory committee to the Minister, a  Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission as well as a Takeover 
Regulation Panel. The Financial Reporting Standards Council 
and the Companies Intellectual Property Registration Office shall 
no longer exist under the draft act. The new Companies Ombud 
is supposed to serve as a forum for alternative dispute resolution 
and shall review certain administrative decisions. 
iii) Scope and categorization of companies 
The Companies Bill 2007 proposes to create three different basic 
types of companies:84 
 
• not for profit companies 
• widely held for profit companies 
• closely held for profit companies 
 
In addition to that there would be a so-called “public interest 
company” label (s 9)85 governed by rules that overlay the three 
other categories. Public interest companies, as opposed to 
“limited interest companies”, have greater responsibility with 
regards to public interests and are subject to stricter regulation 
regarding disclosure and transparency.86 Furthermore, the 
Companies Bill 2007 suggests facilitations for companies that are 
run under certain circumstances, e.g. companies in which all 
shareholders are related, resulting in less necessity for minority 
shareholder protection, or companies whose shareholders are all 
directors, resulting in less need for shareholder participation (see 
below for details). 
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iv) Formation, naming and dissolution 
According to the Department of Trade and Industry’s Explanatory 
Memorandum, the Companies Bill 2007  
 
“places minimal requirements on the act of incorporation, 
allows for maximum flexibility in the design and structure 
of the company, and significantly restricts the ambit of 
regulatory oversight on matters relating to company 
formation and design.” 87  
 
The Companies Bill would make it easier to incorporate 
companies88, e.g. by allowing the memorandum of incorporation 
to be the sole governing document of the company. The Bill also 
proposes to annex a standard form memorandum of association 
to the act, which would provide for the simplest possible form of 
incorporation for companies ready to accept the required default 
provisions without alteration.89 The current Company Act’s 
regulations on how a company must use its name and what 
words must be subjoined to the name remain essentially 
unchanged.90 Names registered under the current act would 
remain registered under the new act. The Bill also proposes to 
amend the regulations on pre-incorporation of contracts in 
section 35 of the Companies Act.91  
v) Company finance 
Company law would “shift from a capital maintenance regime 
based on par value, to one based on solvency and liquidity”92 
under the Companies Bill 2007. The Bill proposes changes 
related to the capital maintenance rule and the requirements that 
must be met before profits or capital can be distributed to the 
shareholders.93 Minority shareholder protection remains 
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essentially unchanged, with the requirement of shareholder 
approval for share and option issues and financial assistance for 
share purchase.94 The Companies Bill 2007 also provides for a 
revised scheme regarding the primary and secondary offering of 
securities to the public. 
vi) Company governance 
The Companies Bill 2007 introduces changes to all kinds of 
matters related to company governance. It would modernise the 
form of shareholder meetings, including the proxy rights and the 
adoption of resolutions.95 The draft makes only minor 
amendments to the existing qualifications and disqualifications 
for directors, in particular regarding very small entities where the 
only shareholder is also its single director (s89 (8) (a) / (b)). 
Regarding directors delinquent or under probation, the draft 
innovates a regime allowing for a court, on application by 
shareholders and other stakeholders, to remove those directors 
from office. Furthermore, the draft proposes a statutory 
codification of a regime of directors’ duties (ss 84 et seqq.), 
including both a fiduciary duty, and a duty of reasonable care, 
which shall complement the existing common law duties.96 The 
regime on directors’ duties would be supplemented by new 
provisions on conflict of interest as well as directors’ liability, 
indemnities and insurance (ss 92 et seqq.). 
 
The relevant part of the draft provision on directors’ duties in the 
Companies Bill 2007 reads as follows: 
 
“91.  Standards of director’s conduct 
 
(1)  Each director of a company, when acting in that 
capacity, or as a member of a committee of 
directors, or when gathering information or similarly 
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preparing to act in either of those capacities, is 
subject to – 
 
 (a) a duty to exercise the degree of care, skill and 
diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably 
diligent individual who had both – (i) the general 
knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably 
be expected of an individual carrying out the same 
functions as are carried out by that director in 
relation to the company; and (ii) the general 
knowledge, skill and experience of that director; and 
 
(b) a second, fiduciary, duty to act honestly and in 
good faith, and in a manner the director reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of, and for the 
benefit of, the company. […]” 
vii) Takeovers and fundamental transactions 
The Companies Bill 2007 introduces the concept of 
amalgamation to South African company law.97 It further 
proposes significant amendments to the law governing takeovers 
and fundamental transactions essentially altering a company, 
e.g. mergers, the said amalgamation, or the disposal of 
substantially all its assets. As a rule, court approval for such 
transactions would be required if a minority of 15% of the 
shareholders opposed the transaction.98 The Bill proposes new 
regimes governing the notification of share purchase and 
remedies for compulsory acquisition of minority shares in 
takeover situations. Furthermore, as indicated before, the 
Companies Bill 2007 envisions the transformation of the existing 
Securities Regulation Panel into an independent organ of state, 
the Takeover Regulation Panel. This institution would remain the 
main public regulator of any fundamental transactions. 
viii) Business rescue 
The Companies Bill 2007 suggests replacing the judicial 
administration of insolvent companies with a modernized regime 
of self-administration and the development of a business rescue 
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plan under independent supervision and subject to court 
intervention.99 The regime is particularly meant to take into 
account the rights of shareholders, creditors and employees.  
ix) Remedies 
The South African High Court remains the main judicial forum for 
remedies under the Companies Bill 2007. However, the act 
introduces certain new general principles. These include: a new 
declaratory order as to a shareholder’s rights, a right to have a 
director declared delinquent, and possibilities to enhance and 
protect the work of so-called “whistle blowers” who report 
irregularities in the company to the authorities.100 Moreover, the 
act proposes to strengthen the judicial rights of dissenting 
shareholders in fundamental transactions to have their shares 
appraised and purchased.101  
x) Enforcement 
Firstly, the Companies Bill 2007 proposes to decriminalize South 
African company law. Criminal provisions in company law would 
be restricted to very few significant offences, such as refusal to 
respond to a summons, give evidence, perjury, and similar 
matters with respect to the administration of justice. Notably, the 
draft proposes that it would be an offence, “punishable by a fine 
or up to 10 years imprisonment, for a director to sign or agree to 
a false or misleading financial statement or prospectus, or to be 
reckless in the conduct of a company’s business”.102 Instead of a 
broad range of criminal provisions, the draft act suggests using a 
system of administrative enforcement through the various state 
institutions responsible for the administration of company law. 
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xi) Transitional period 
There are transitional provisions in the Companies Bill 2007 
(s 6). Those would allow existing companies under the current 
Companies Act, which would in the future be governed by the 
new proposed Bill, a transitional period in order to adapt their 
articles of association. The Bill also includes proposed 
regulations on the voluntary conversion of existing or newly 
created close corporations into companies under the new act.103 
xii) Details on the new “closely held company” 
This mini-thesis essentially analyses ways of enhancing small 
and medium-sized businesses through company law legislation. 
The Companies Bill 2007 envisions a new regime for closely held 
companies, with a bespoke solution for typically small and 
medium-sized businesses. As said before, the closely held 
company of the Companies Bill 2007 would compete with the 
Close Corporation for an experimental 10-year period.  
(a) Definition of a closely held company 
According to the Companies Bill 2007 the term “closely 
held company” encompasses all for profit companies that 
are not widely held companies. Section 8 (2) of the Bill 
defines that a for profit company is a widely held company 
if -  
“(a) the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation –  
(i) permits it to offer any of its shares to the public, 
within the meaning of sections 60 and 61; 
(ii) limits, negates or restricts the pre-emptive right 
of every shareholder set out in section 36 (1); or 
(iii) provides for the unrestricted transferability of 
any of its shares; or 
(b) a majority of its shares are held by another widely 
held company, or collectively by two or more 
related or inter-related persons, any one of which 
is a widely held company.” 
 
All remaining for profit companies would consequently be 
closely held companies. It becomes apparent that closely 
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held companies would characteristically be owned neither 
by an indefinite circle of “public” shareholders, nor by a 
widely held company. The shares of a closely held 
company would not be transferable without restrictions. 
The closely held company would adjoin the words “CHC 
Limited” or “CHC Ltd” to its name (ss 16 (2) and 19 (2) (b) 
(iii)). Provisions on special treatment of closely held 
companies are found throughout the Companies Bill 2007. 
The most significant of these provisions are: 
(b) Exemption from certain provisions 
According to section 7 (3) of the Companies Bill 2007, the 
closely held company would be exempt from application of 
sections 97 to 103 and 116 to 118 of the bill if all of the 
shares of that company are owned by one person, or by 
two or more related or inter-related persons. Those 
sections regulate the following matters: 
 
• In s95 to s99 (Financial year, records and reporting)  
o s97: Annual financial statements 
o s98: Disclosure of directors’ remuneration 
and benefits 
o s99: Right to copies of financial statements 
and reports 
• In s100 to s103 (Financial accountability) 
o s100: Audit committees 
o s101 Appointment and rotation of auditors  
o s102:Rights, duties and functions of auditors 
o s103:Resignation of auditors and filling of 
casual vacancies 
• In s112 to s120 (Regulation and implementation of 
certain transactions) 
o s116:Proposals to dispose of substantially all 
assets of undertaking 
o s117:Proposals for merger or amalgamation 
o s118:Proposals for scheme of arrangement 
 
According to section 112(2) of the Companies Bill 2007 all 
closely held companies are exempt from application of 
sections 113 to 115 of the bill: 
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• In s112 to s120 (Regulation and implementation of 
certain transactions) 
o s113:Required disclosure concerning certain 
share transactions 
o s114: Mandatory offers 
o s115:Compulsory acquisitions and squeeze 
out 
 
Moreover, according to section 112(3)(b) and (c) of the 
Companies Bill 2007, sections 116, 117 (2) to (5), 118 (2) 
and (3) and 119 do not apply with respect to a closely held 
company if all of its shares are held by persons who are 
related or inter-related; to all other closely held companies 
they only apply if the memorandum of incorporation of the 
company expressly provides that the sections apply to the 
company. 104 
 
• In s112 to s120 (Regulation and implementation of 
certain transactions) 
o s116:Proposals to dispose of substantially all 
assets of undertaking 
o s117:Proposals for merger or amalgamation 
o s118:Proposals for scheme of arrangement 
o s119:Required approval for transactions 
contemplated in this part 
(c) Filing of memorandum of incorporation 
According to s 15 (1) of the Companies Bill 2007 the 
closely held company would not be required to file its 
memorandum of incorporation for registration. 
(d) Shareholder approval for issuing shares 
If every shareholder of a closely held company is also a 
director of that company, the company is exempt from 
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s 38 of the Companies Bill 2007 which stipulates the 
requirement of shareholder approval for issuing shares in 
certain cases. 
(e) Options for purchase of shares 
According to s 39 (6) of the Bill, s 39 (4) is not applicable 
to closely held companies, if every shareholder of the 
company is also a director of that company. Section 39 (4) 
of the Companies Bill 2007 stipulates certain legal 
requirements for options for the purchase of shares 
granted directly or indirectly to a director or future director, 
including authorization in terms of a special resolution.  
(f)  Financial assistance for the purchase of shares 
Financial assistance by a closely held company to a 
person for the purchase of shares or options issued or to 
be issued can, according to the Companies Bill 2007, 
amongst other requirements only be given pursuant to a 
certain authorization set out in the company’s 
memorandum of incorporation (s 40 (1) (b) (iii) (cc)).  
(g) Time frame for board authorized distributions 
Regarding closely held companies, section 48 (2) (a) (ii) of 
the Companies Bill 2007 sets a maximum time frame of 
120 days after the first distribution payment to a 
shareholder in accordance with the authorizing board 
resolution, after which the board must reconsider a 
liquidity and solvency test before further distribution. In a 
widely held company the time frame of 120 days starts 
earlier, namely on the date on which the company 
announces the resolution authorizing the distribution 
(s 48 (2) (a) (i)). 
(h) Shareholder meetings and notice of meetings 
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According to s 79 of the Companies Bill 2007, the closely 
held company must hold meetings of shareholders as 
required by the company’s memorandum of incorporation. 
Widely held companies must give notice of the meetings 
to the shareholders 15 business days before the meeting 
(s 80 (1) (c)). For the closely held company this period is 
only 10 days as a rule (s 80 (1) (b)), and only 5 days if all 
the shares are owned by persons who are related or inter-
related (s 80 (1) (a)). 
(i)  Directors 
Same as the Close Corporation, the closely held 
corporation which does not qualify as public interest 
company needs to have only one director (s 84 (1) (b)), 
instead of three like the widely held corporation (s 84 (1) 
(a)). Section 89 (8) (a) / (b) of the Companies Bills makes 
certain significant exceptions for the closely held company 
from the rules on the disqualification of directors. 
(j)  Financial assistance to directors 
According to s 92A (1) (d) (iii) of the Companies Bill 2007, 
financial assistance by the company to a director can only 
be given pursuant to a certain authorization set out in the 
company’s memorandum of incorporation. 
(k) Register of directors, auditors and secretaries 
A closely held company that is not a public interest 
company and the shares of which are all owned by 
persons who are related or inter-related is not obliged to 
keep a register of directors, auditors and secretaries 
(s 94 (1) (a)). 
(l)  Conclusion 
The Companies Bill 2007 offers a variety of provisions, 
forming a detailed and bespoke system of facilitations for 
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closely held companies in order to specifically enhance 
the growth of typically small and medium-sized 
businesses. 
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IV. Teleology of a Statute for the European Private Company 
 
In order to assess the necessary scope, structure and content of a future statute 
for the EPC, its teleological backgrounds and aims need to be identified: 
A. General 
The overall aim of the EPC Statute is to free enterprises, notably small and 
medium-sized businesses, from the legal and practical constraints resulting 
from their operations under up to 27 separate national legal systems in the 27 
Member States of the European Union. It is important to note that national 
company laws and their diverse legal would forms remain untouched by the 
Statute and the EPC would exist with those forms side by side105. 
B. Definition of the term “small and medium-sized business” 
99,8% of all companies in the European Union are categorized as small and 
medium-sized businesses which account for about 30% of all employment 
positions.106 The European Commission defines small and medium-sized 
businesses as follows.107 Medium-sized enterprises have less than 250 
employees and their annual turnover does not exceed € 50 million108 or their 
annual balance-sheet total is less than € 43 million. Small enterprises have 
between 10 and 49 employees and they have an annual turnover not 
exceeding € 10 million and/or an annual balance-sheet total not exceeding € 
10 million. Micro-enterprises are enterprises, which have less than 10 
employees and they have an annual turnover not exceeding € 2 million and/or 
an annual balance-sheet total not exceeding € 2 million. Furthermore, one 
distinguishes two kinds of small and medium-sized businesses: firstly, the very 
small owner-managed business formed by a small number of members, 
possibly all related or inter-related, operating the company in a way 
comparable to partnership, and secondly the slightly larger enterprise with a 
larger and more diverse group of members, of whom one or more are usually 
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financial investors contributing to the capital but not participating actively in the 
management of the business.  
C. Constraints on small and medium-sized businesses 
The problems small and medium-sized businesses face in their European 
cross-border activities are mainly related to the diversity and complexity of 
national company laws in the European Union (market fragmentation).109 The 
current pan-European company law framework, which is supposed to 
harmonize the laws and overcome the difficulties, is so far insufficient. 
1. Diversity and complexity of national company laws 
Small and medium-sized businesses with cross-border activity in the 
European Union face significant obstacles related to the diverse legal 
forms of companies and the complexity of national company laws when 
conducting business in other Member States. 
a) The difficulty of choice 
An entrepreneur or an existing company planning to conduct business 
in another Member State need to familiarize themselves with the 
national frameworks of up to 27 host countries and take a decision 
with regards to the legal form they would operate with in each of them. 
There are four basic options for conducting cross-border business in 
foreign Member States:110 
 
• A subsidiary abroad: 
 registration of the existing home company with the foreign 
register of the host country (so-called “European 
passport”), or 
 formation and registration of a new foreign legal entity in 
the host country on grounds of host legislation, 
 
• A branch abroad 
 opening a registered branch in the host country, or 
 running a branch without any formal organisation or 
registration (de facto branch) in the host country.111 
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The choice is difficult and obviously tends to become increasingly 
complex with each additional Member State the business seeks to 
expand into. It is not unlikely that it would make sense for a particular 
entrepreneur to choose a different strategy for each single country he 
plans to go to. For example in one country a newly founded subsidiary 
company might be more favourably taxed than a branch. In another 
country the minimum legal capital of a certain type of company might 
be too high and a branch would be the only feasible alternative 
although maybe unattractively taxed. The range and complexity of 
legal and financial parameters to be taken into account is 
extraordinary. Different tax regimes, legal capital requirements as well 
as formation and registration procedures are only some factors of 
many to be taken into account, and not the trickiest ones. Another 
typical constraint is that potential liability risks for shareholders and 
company directors in foreign jurisdictions are not easy to evaluate 
properly. For example the legal possibility of “piercing the corporate 
veil”112 of limited liability in certain cases of abuse is regulated in 
27 very different ways throughout the Union.  
b) Significant costs of establishing business abroad 
The difficulty of choice corresponds to another highly adverse effect. 
In order to assess options and identify a strategy for cross-border 
business the entrepreneur is dependant on costly professional 
advisors, notably lawyers and tax advisors. He needs bespoke advice 
regarding the ideal and most cost- and time-efficient way to act for his 
particular enterprise in each of the potential target Member States. 
The diversity and complexity of national company laws, and the legal 
uncertainty they result in, are therefore also major cost-driving factors 
for European businesses establishing business abroad. In addition to 
advisor fees there are the costs of formation and registration of up to 
27 different subsidiaries or branches, including possibly the 
notarisation of documents which is mandatory in certain Member 
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States (e.g. Germany). The more Member States the business seeks 
to expand into, the more costs the operation is likely to incur. 
c) Significant costs of conducting day-to-day business abroad 
The diversity and complexity of national laws also affect the day-to-
day operations in cross-border business and increase costs. Due to 
the different national legal requirements concerning the legal structure 
and the organisation of a subsidiary or a branch, the daily business 
management and coordination is usually more difficult and more 
costly in comparison to the management of the mother company at 
home,113 this regard amongst other things the accounting and the 
documentation of general assemblies. 
d) Difficulties in cross-border capital raising 
Cross-border capital raising is one of the preconditions for 
successfully setting up and expanding business in a European and 
globalized market. The free movement of capital is one of the 
fundamental EC-Treaty freedoms and an important vehicle for 
integration. Market fragmentation regarding company law in the 27 
Member States poses a serious constraint on the supply of capital for 
European companies. Investors, including large venture capital funds, 
are dissuaded by high transaction costs and legal uncertainty.114 
Facilitating cross-border operations could help to increase the overall 
supply of capital. 
2. Current pan-European framework insufficient 
Small and medium-sized businesses consider the existing legal framework 
on a European level insufficient for their cross-border activities.115 About 
60% of respondents to the European Commission’s 2007 Consultation 
agree “that there is no existing legal company form suitable to conduct 
business throughout the European Union.”116 Notably the conduct of 
business of the existing mother company under its own name and legal 
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form in another Member State suffers from the widespread lack of trust in 
foreign legal forms abroad, irrespective of their origin. This lack of trust is 
considered as a major barrier to cross-border activity.117 One could argue 
that the option to operate with the existing home company abroad by 
registering it in the host country (European passport) has been facilitated 
significantly by the European Court of Justice’s recent case law on 
corporate mobility in Europe, notably in the so-called Centros case.118 This 
development could potentially give rise to doubts regarding the need for 
an EPC Statute. Drury replies to such concerns:119  
 
“[...] there are many reasons to doubt whether this particular [juridical] 
‘climate change’ is as profound as appears at first sight. While some of 
these developments may have marginalized some of the advantages 
sought by the European Private Company project, they do not actually 
touch the core issues that lie behind the case for a transnational 
corporate vehicle designed essentially to be friendly to small 
businesses.”  
 
I agree that the range of possible options for the entrepreneurs is still 
highly complex and up until today results in significant legal uncertainty 
and costs that need to be reduced.  
 
Moreover, the existing pan-European public limited company (SE) is not 
regarded as a suitable option for small and medium-sized businesses120 
because its legal structure and management is too complicated and its 
establishment with a minimum legal capital of € 120.000 too expensive. A 
statute for a pan-European company should help overcome all the 
abovementioned difficulties. 
3. Other obstacles to cross-border business 
The European Commission 2007 Consultation report points out that 
diverging company laws and the insufficiency of the current framework are 
not the only obstacle to cross-border business and names tax, social and 
commercial provisions, including a fragmented intellectual property (IP) 
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protection as well as cultural and language barriers as further sources of 
difficulties.121 
D. Advantages of an EPC Statute 
The following are considered to be the most significant advantages of a 
uniform EPC Statute throughout the European Union: 
1. Simple operation in several Member States  
The most significant advantage of a uniform EPC Statute will be that it 
enables companies to opt for the same internal organisation, no matter 
where in Europe they conduct business, and that they will no longer have 
to deal with 27 different legal systems. Instead, there will be standardized 
rules across the European Union. This regards both, the establishment of 
a company in a foreign European country and its day-to-day management. 
The more countries a business is active in, the higher the level of 
advantage it can draw from an EPC as legal form. As a matter of fact, 
more than 80% of respondents to the European Commission’s 2007 
Consultation would prefer to register a company in another Member State 
as an EPC, 122 instead of registering their home company, and consider 
that the EPC would be “an attractive form of subsidiary for groups of 
Companies”. 
2. Cost reduction 
It is a core principle of the European Internal Market that crossing borders 
must not cause additional costs.123 If properly developed and legislated, 
the EPC Statute could significantly reduce the costs that cross-border 
businesses face in relation to the diversity of national legal forms. This 
also regards both, the establishment of a company in a foreign European 
country as well as its day-to-day management and it is particularly true for 
enterprises which conduct business in more than two or up to 27 Member 
States.   
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3. European Label 
Moreover, the so-called European label “EPC” could turn out to be a 
helpful marketing tool in pan-European and global business. Three 
quarters of respondents to the European Commission’s 2007 Consultation 
considered the European label as an added-value and believe that it 
would enhance their company’s “image, visibility, competitiveness and 
dynamism”.124 The added-value would be highest for companies from 
countries whose legal forms are not as widely known and recognized. For 
example it will be easier for a Romanian entrepreneur to build up a 
business relationship with French or German clients, lenders or suppliers if 
he uses an EPC as a vehicle, instead of a national legal form the structure 
of which is most likely unclear to them. 
4. Advantages summarized 
Schunk, a German medium-sized entrepreneur and company lawyer with 
an active cross-border business in several European countries and 
speaker at the European Commission’s 2008 Conference, summarizes the 
advantages from a practical point of view:125 
 
“Of a European Private Company we expect significant simplifications 
of the founding process and of the day-to-day administration of our 
subsidiaries. Because: 
 
• We would not have to deal with foreign company law any longer 
• We would have less consultancy fees regarding the formation 
and the drafting of a company statute 
• We could use standardised European-wide model articles 
• We could evaluate liability risks more easily 
• We could establish uniform structures e.g. regarding all 
management bodies of the various companies 
• We would have a European label.” 
 
                                            
124
 European Commission, 2007 Consultation, Summary Report, p. 6; see also Steinberger, BB 2006, 
Vol. 37 (Beilage), p. 29 
125
 Schunk, Presentation at the European Commission’s 2008 Conference 
 
 
 
 
 54 
E. Constraints of the European Private Company 
1. Possible disadvantages of regulating an EPC Statute 
There are, in my view, no disadvantages of an EPC Statute conceivable. 
Every European entrepreneur will be perfectly free to choose whether the 
EPC is a suitable legal form for his business, or whether he prefers one of 
the traditional options for cross-border business. There will be no 
obligation to act under the new European label.126 This means that the 
EPC Statute will not result in any new practical constraints or additional 
difficulties and costs for entrepreneurs. The range of possibilities for 
European small and medium-sized businesses is simply broadened.  
2. Limits of the European Private Company 
The EPC Statue will regulate the applicable company law for the EPC. 
Several other, related legal matters that would also urgently require 
harmonization simply cannot be addressed by the EPC Statute, but must 
remain regulated under national law. The legal matters that need to remain 
outside the EPC Statute will also remain outside the scope of this mini-
thesis. They concern notably tax and accounting matters as well as social, 
labour and criminal legislation with regards to the EPC. 
a) Tax matters 
Diverging domestic tax legislations significantly hamper cross-border 
business in Europe. One of the major problems of legislating the EPC 
Statute at this point in time is the fact that tax issues will have to 
remain outside the new legal framework.127 Although the majority of 
respondents to the European Commission’s 2007 Consultation would 
like to see tax matters addressed in the EPC Statute,128 such an 
approach is out of the question. The general taxation laws of the 
Member State in which the EPC will be registered, tax resident and/or 
in which it will have a taxable presence will therefore apply to it. 
European domestic tax laws are currently too diverse, too complicated 
and not ready for harmonization at this point in time at all. Also the 
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interests at stake are too powerful.129 Tax aspects therefore remain 
outside the scope of the EPC Statute. The EPC Statute will 
unfortunately have to simplify the regulatory environment by 
concentrating on company law and without addressing tax matters. 
This mini-thesis therefore exclusively refers to the Statute as one that 
does not address tax issues.  
b) Other matters 
The same essentially applies to some other branches of law that are 
not company law, such as national labour, social and criminal 
legislation, requirements with regard to audit and the format and 
publication of accounts as well as procedures for insolvency. They will 
also remain outside the scope of the EPC Statute.130 In such matters, 
submitting the EPC to each national law seems to be the only possible 
solution. Here the Statute will not touch on the matter itself, but it will 
have to establish functional links to the respective national laws 
without interfering in the national laws as such, i.e. the Statute must 
determine reasonable boundaries of that field of law. It is understood 
that for this purpose there should at least be an annex to the Statute 
listing the form of company to which the EPC shall be considered 
equivalent in each Member State, in particular in respect of the 
application of the said legislations. 
  
The aforementioned fields of law will consequently not be addressed 
in this mini-thesis, with the exception of a couple of insolvency related 
matters that are very closely intertwined with the field of company law 
and hardly separable from it, and therefore have to be dealt with in the 
EPC Statute itself131 (notably director’s duties regarding capital 
maintenance).  
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c) National regulatory matters 
Moreover, it goes without saying that where a business requires 
regulatory approval in a Member State either to carry on business or 
to sell a particular product, the establishment of an EPC will not, of 
itself, enable an approval in one Member State automatically to apply 
to other Member States. 
F. Teleology summary 
It is the aim of the EPC Statute to facilitate the conduct of cross-border 
business for European small and medium-sized enterprises in the European 
Internal Market. This is going to be achieved by providing them with a 
European uniform and flexible legal company form throughout the Member 
States. The availability of uniform corporate rules should significantly reduce 
costs related to the establishment and conduct in a foreign Member State. It 
should reduce legal uncertainty and strengthen the businesses’ cross-border 
mobility and competitiveness.  
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V. Discussion of the European Key Issues 
 
The following chapter is providing an in-depth discussion of the most important 
legal Key Issues regarding the scope, content and structure of the future EPC 
Statute. It is undisputed that the EPC shall be a private limited company.132 It 
shall possess legal personality and its liability for debts to creditors shall be 
limited to its assets.133 It shall offer companies an additional, voluntary option, 
alongside national company forms, in terms of how they may constitute 
themselves.134 Apart from that, almost everything about the EPC’s future scope, 
structure and content is yet to be defined. As said before, certain matters such 
as labour, social and penal legislation, requirements with regard to audit, and 
the format and publication of accounts and procedures for insolvency as well as 
all tax matters will remain outside the scope of the EPC Statute and this mini-
thesis, or will only be touched briefly. The following is a short overview of the 
Key Issue Groups and Key Issues to be discussed in this mini-thesis: 
 
• Key Issue Group A: Overall Uniformity of the Statute (see below A.) 
 Key Issue 1: Statutory Uniformity 
 Key Issue 2: Contractual Uniformity 
 
• Key Issue Group B: Formation and Registration (see below B.) 
 Key Issue 1: Formation 
 Key Issue 2: Registration 
 
• Key Issue Group C: Shareholders (see below C.) 
 Key Issue 1: Shareholder Structure 
 Key Issue 2: General meeting, resolutions, voting 
 
• Key Issue Group D: Share Capital (see below D.) 
 Key Issue 1: Minimum Legal Capital 
 Key Issue 2: Shareholder Contributions 
 Key Issue 3: Shares and Share Classes 
 Key issue 4: Share Transfer, Restrictions and Pre-emption Rights 
 
• Key Issue Group E: Management (see below E.) 
 Key Issue 1: Overall Management Structure 
 Key Issue 2: Nomination and Eligibility of Directors 
 Key Issue 3: Powers of Directors 
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 Key Issue 4: Duties of Directors 
 Key Issue 5: Directors’ Liabilities 
 Key Issue 6: Employee Participation at Board Level 
 
• Key Issue Group F: Creditor Protection (see below F.) 
 Key Issue 1: Transparency and Public Disclosures 
 Key Issue 2: Specific Directors’ Duties 
 Key Issue 3: Distribution Limits 
 Key Issue 4: Subordination of Shareholder Loans to the Company 
 
• Key Issue Group G: Duration, Termination, Dissolution (see below G.) 
 
A. Key Issue Group: Overall uniformity of the statute 
Uniformity of the EPC and the EPC Statute throughout the European Union is 
an important aim in order to make the EPC a widely accepted and truly 
European legal form. However, in a legal environment as diverse as the 
European Union, lawmakers need to determine to which extent the EPC 
Statute must and can actually be uniform in 27 different Member States. 
Overall uniformity of the Statute has two recurring structural aspects: a 
statutory aspect (see below 1.) and a contractual aspect (see below 2.). In 
addition to the following general discussion, the question of uniformity will be 
addressed specifically with regards to each of the Key Issues, if necessary. 
1. Statutory uniformity of the statute 
a) The problem 
It needs to be determined to what extent the EPC Statute shall be 
uniform throughout the European Union in terms of references to 
domestic statutory law. Should the Statute, instead of regulating 
certain matters, just refer to national law or should it be 
comprehensive and stand-alone? There are essentially two positions: 
either the EPC Statute is designed more or less exempt of references 
to national laws and therefore very detailed but essentially uniform. Or 
the Statute, in place of regulating every possible matter in detail, 
refers to national statutes and their very diverse regulations regarding 
certain legal matters. In that latter case, an EPC would be partly 
governed by the domestic laws of the Member State in which it is 
registered. Such a Statute would, to a certain extent, be shorter and 
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simpler, but not statutorily uniform. It would be intertwined with all 
kinds of national legal systems in the Member States. Consequently, 
the EPCs that will be registered on grounds of the EPC Statute and 
the domestic laws they respectively refer to, will not be uniform but 
diversified across the Union. 
b) The European Parliament’s opinion 
The European Parliament takes the view that an EPC Statute “should 
be based as far as possible on rules of Community law and should 
thus dispense with references to national law: it should therefore be 
conceived as a uniform and definitive statute.”135 It names an 
extensive list of legal matters to be regulated in the EPC Statute.136 “In 
other areas”, according to the European Parliament “the Statute 
should in principle apply, and any rules going beyond it should apply 
only in a subsidiary manner, in the following order of precedence: 
other rules of Community law; provisions governing comparable types 
of company in the Member State in which the company has its 
registered office.”137 To avoid legal uncertainty, according to the 
European Parliament, the EPC Statute should have an annex listing 
the types of national legal forms the EPC is equated with in respect of 
areas not covered by the regulation.138 
c) The European Commission’s 2007 Consultation  
In the European Commission’s 2007 Consultation numerous 
respondents insisted “that the SPE will only be useful and provide 
added-value if its statute is uniform throughout the European 
Union”.139 The majority clearly favoured a Statute completely exempt 
from references to national law: “References to national law are likely 
to lead to as many kinds of SPEs as there are Member States, thus 
depriving the SPE of much of its attractiveness”140 and a comment 
frequently made was that “to bring real added-value, the SPE statute 
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should be simple and clear and, most importantly, as autonomous and 
as free as possible from national rules.”  
d) Preferable solution 
In light of the problems businesses face in their cross-border activities 
and the EPC Statute’s aim to enhance their overall growth, it seems 
indeed vital that the Statute provides for a legal framework as uniform 
as possible throughout the European Union. The importance of 
statutory uniformity can hardly be overrated. The EPC Statute should 
be exempt from references to national law as far as possible, and it 
should be mainly withdrawn from the jurisdictions of the Member 
States. With every reference to national law in the EPC Statute the 
legal structure of the EPC threatens to become more complicated and 
unmanageable. This would result in even more legal uncertainty 
instead of less and would turn the Statute’s teleology upside-down. A 
mixture of European and national regulations beyond the 
indispensable is likely to increase, rather than reduce the costly need 
for legal advice on establishing and running businesses in foreign 
Member States.141 Without a maximum of uniformity, the chances that 
the EPC turns out as a simple and inexpensive instrument for 
conducting cross-border business drop considerably. In particular, the 
notion of a European label would not work in an EPC that has 27 
different faces. Preferably nothing should be left to national laws,142 
with the exception of certain fields in which harmonization is 
impossible at the moment (e.g. tax as mentioned before). The 
discussion of the following Key Issues will be made in light of this 
finding (see each relevant Key Issue below for details). 
e) The further problem of regulatory gaps 
A further problem related to statutory uniformity is what happens if 
regulatory gaps are found in the legal framework. Teichmann offers 
three thoughts on that risk:143 Firstly, it must be ensured during the 
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legislative process that few regulatory gaps can possible arise by 
providing a well drafted Statute that is tailored to the needs of small 
and medium-sized businesses. Secondly, the Statute should provide 
for model articles of association with default provisions in order to 
avoid gaps in the actual articles of association (for details on model 
articles see below). Thirdly, according to Teichmann, not every single 
possible case can be legislated for in the Statute or the articles of 
association. Here the legislative technique of using general clauses in 
the Statute should help. Those general clauses shall be interpreted by 
the national courts with a common point of reference in European Law 
and the possibility of referring a particular case to the European Court 
of Justice, if necessary. 
2. Contractual uniformity of the statute 
a) The problem 
There is a need to determine how flexible the EPC Statute can be in 
terms of contractual freedom. To what extent must the Statute 
regulate certain matters and to what extent can it be silent on other 
matters and leave them to the company’s articles of association? A 
related question is whether or not there should be model articles of 
association. 
b) The European Commission’s 2007 Consultation 
Most respondents of the European Commission’s 2007 Consultation 
considered that the Statute should be as open as possible offering 
maximum flexibility144 and leaving as much regulation as possible to 
the company’s constitution or articles of association. Many 
respondents thought that contractual freedom could be greater in a 
single shareholder company as opposed to a multiple shareholder 
company145 because there are no potential conflicts of interest 
between shareholders. Others thought that a broad margin of 
contractual freedom could hamper the EPC’s uniformity throughout 
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the European Union and that the Statute should rather provide for 
definitive and binding, instead of soft legal provisions.  
c) Preferable solution 
In my view, a maximum of uniformity is desirable but at the same time 
there needs to be a high degree of flexibility for entrepreneurs and 
their ventures.146 These conflicting objectives need to be balanced. 
The EPC Statute should therefore provide for a sound and 
comprehensive set of standard rules regulating the most basic and 
important legal cornerstones of the EPC.147 The details could be left to 
contractual freedom and should be regulated in the respective articles 
of association in order to ensure flexibility for businesses to regulate 
their own affairs. De Kluiver agrees and considers that the EPC 
Statute should be more principle based than rule based.148 This will 
ensure a sufficient level of uniformity throughout the Union. 
Teichmann points out that  
 
“it is precisely contractual freedom which offers the founders the 
possibility to tailor provisions for themselves which apply Europe-
wide. The parent company in state A can provide its subsidiaries 
in states B, C and D with the same articles of association. This 
simplifies cross-border corporate governance and saves 
considerable costs compared with the administration of 
subsidiaries all of which have to follow different legal 
regulations.”149  
 
As a rule, most issues related to the company’s external relations, 
including e.g. creditor protection, must be catered for in the EPC 
Statute. On the other hand, uniformity is essentially only required 
regarding the external relations so that many of the internal relations 
can be left to contractual freedom. The in-depth question whether a 
particular point should be left to the articles of association must be 
analyzed separately for each legal Key Issue in question and will 
therefore be dealt with as part of the further discussion (see each 
relevant Key Issue below for details). 
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d) Model articles of association 
The flexibility reached by a Statute leaving certain matters to 
contractual freedom comes at a price: there will be legal issues left to 
be decided or designed by the founders. This in turn incurs costs for 
legal advisors that the EPC Statute is meant to reduce. Particularly 
small businesses in most cases cannot afford legal advice from law-
firms specialized in European corporate law. Model articles of 
association are therefore a tool to bring a flexible Statute in line with 
its overall objective of enhancing the growth and prosperity of small 
businesses.150 Smaller companies, instead of hiring expensive 
lawyers, can simply pattern their articles of association on model 
articles of association.151 If, after all, a large part of the EPC’s 
structure will be left to contractual freedom, there must, in my view, be 
official model articles of association annexed to the EPC Statute. 
These model articles could possibly have two different functions, a so-
called residual function, a pure model function or a hybrid function. 
i) Residual function 
One function of the model articles of association could be that 
they apply by default where the company’s actual articles are 
silent on a certain point (default or residual function). One 
prominent example of model articles with a residual function is 
Table A of the British Companies Act of 1985. A residual function   
would mean that the model articles have a quasi-regulatory 
scope because the founders would have to opt-out of certain 
provisions of the model articles, either by expressly excluding 
their application or by regulating certain matters differently in the 
actual articles of association. Particularly Teichmann strongly 
promotes model articles with a residual function and points out 
that the model articles are necessary to fill all kinds of gaps in the 
regulatory and contractual framework of the EPC.152 
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ii) Model function 
Model articles of association with only a model function, not a 
residual function, are only meant to be a source of inspiration for 
founders of EPCs without the legal effect of filling any contractual 
gaps by default. Draftsmen can voluntarily draw upon the “tool-
box” of model articles when drafting the actual articles.  
iii) Hybrid function 
Ideally, model articles have both, a model as well as residual 
function. However, Holmquist points out that a mixed residual / 
model approach would hardly be viable: if the model articles have 
a residual function, there would only be very limited room left for 
a model function153 because the residual model articles would 
apply by default and can therefore not offer several alternative 
solutions to a certain matter. Residual model articles have to be 
unambiguous and cannot provide alternative options catering for 
diverse needs of entrepreneurs. 
iv) Comment 
The EPC Statute will leave a large number of legal issues to be 
regulated by the articles of association (see the Key Issue 
discussion below for details). It would therefore be highly 
recommendable to make use of official model articles of 
association annexed to the Statute. These model articles must, in 
my view, have a residual function. This is necessary because 
practical experience shows that the actual articles of association 
of many EPCs will be faulty or incomplete and in some cases 
even dysfunctional. Such contractual and regulatory gaps could 
not only potentially damage the EPC’s standing in the public eye 
but also lead to all kinds of internal disputes between the 
shareholders. If the articles of association fail to regulate a matter 
left to contractual freedom, there must be a default provision of 
some kind in order to ensure the proper working of the company. 
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This function can only be catered for by the model articles of 
association.  
 
However, in my opinion, the model articles of association should 
and could not only have a residual function, but a model function 
as well. In the light of Holmquist’s critique of hybrid model 
articles, the only viable option to achieve both functions would be 
to offer two alternative versions of the model articles:154 one 
model text serving as a standard of minimum requirements with a 
residual function and the other text, a diversified version serving 
as inspiration and a tool-box for founders including various 
alternatives for diverse needs of entrepreneurs.  
B. Key Issue Group: Formation and registration 
1. Formation 
The EPC Statute will have to determine according to which rules the 
formation of an EPC will be possible.  
a) Statute or contractual freedom 
The majority of respondents to the European Commission’s 2007 
Consultation considered the formation of an EPC an issue which 
should be dealt with in the EPC Statute comprehensively and could 
not be left to the articles of association.155 Provisions on formation in 
the Statute are indeed necessary because the formation concerns the 
very essence of the EPC’s existence, the root of the corporate 
structure, and defines its overall shape. The standards regarding 
formation must be included in the Statute. Regarding the company’s 
formation, uniformity is not only one of several possible policy 
objectives, but an absolute must and the Statute is the only way to 
ensure it. 
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b) Methods of formation 
In order to achieve high practical flexibility, there should be different 
possible ways of forming an EPC. First of all, it should be possible to 
newly create an EPC by founding it ex nihilo. Furthermore, it should 
be possible for existing national companies, no matter if private or 
public, to be converted or to merge into a European Private Company. 
This would make the legal form of an EPC as attractive as possible for 
all kinds of medium-sized groups of companies dealing with 
permanently evolving and complex structures of numerous 
subsidiaries. Accordingly, the European Parliament suggests that 
there should be different options regarding the formation156 including 
conversions. It summarizes the relevant topics to be regulated relating 
to possible conversions: the EPC must be able to merge with other 
companies,157 split and change into, for example a European 
Company (SE),158 as far as possible in accordance with Community 
law which has already been harmonised. Moreover, according to the 
Parliament, it must in turn be possible for national companies to 
convert into an EPC and to re-convert from an EPC into a national 
legal form.159 The Statue should allow for named conversions. Some 
aspects of the legal issues arising out of such conversions can be 
dealt with by reference to the already existing Third European 
Company Directive (merger directive). 
c) Form 
In many European jurisdictions the incorporation documents can 
exclusively be set up by way of a notarial deed. This is to make sure 
that the documents are properly set up, authentic and complete in 
terms of necessary or mandatory legal content. The EPC is meant to 
become a flexible and cost-effective legal form. It would therefore be 
best to allow for the formation by means of simply written documents, 
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without the necessity of involving a public notary. In that case it must 
be regulated that the public registration authorities have to test and 
confirm the authenticity of submitted incorporation documents, instead 
of the notary (see below for details). 
d) Name and objects of Company  
The majority of respondents to the European Commission’s 2007 
Consultation considered the name and the objects of the EPC issues 
which should be dealt with in the EPC Statute and could not be left to 
the articles of association.160 Holmquist on the other hand suggests to 
leave the determination of name and objects to the model articles of 
association.161  
 
Essentially, I agree that the model articles, and not the Statute, should 
provide for all kinds of voluntary stipulations regarding name and 
object of the EPC. However, in my view, the most basic foundations 
with regards to the company’s trade name need to be withdrawn from 
the disposition of the founders and by means of regulation in the 
Statute. This is necessary to ensure a minimum of uniformity of the 
EPC’s “face”. After all, one of the envisioned advantages of the EPC 
is its European label function. The Paris Chamber of Commerce made 
a convincing suggestion of the following wording (Article 7):162  
 
”The EPC shall select a corporate name which may include the 
object of the company, the name of one or more shareholders, or 
be entirely imaginary, provided that it must not be misleading or 
liable to cause confusion. The company's name shall be 
preceded or followed immediately by the words "European 
Private Company" or the acronym "EPC"”.  
 
Such stipulation in the EPC Statute would be a sufficient to avoid a 
myriad of different EPC labels without any kind of cross-border “brand 
recognition effect.”   
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2. Registration 
The EPC’s incorporation and constitutional documents will have to be 
submitted to a public register. As usual, the EPC will acquire status as an 
independent legal person with registration. The formalities and procedures 
regarding the registration of an EPC need to be determined by the 
European lawmakers drafting the EPC Statute. They are of particular 
importance for the success of the EPC as a legal form.  
a) Overview of issues regarding national registration 
The different national registration procedures for European limited 
liability companies are very diverse and not at all harmonized. For 
example, in some countries, such as Germany, the registration of a 
private limited company is only possible if the deed of formation is 
notarized (see also above). Other countries accept corporate 
documents in simple written form. The institutional structure of the 
competent registrar authorities ranges from registers administered by 
judicial courts to private bodies. The length of the registration 
processes vary from a few days to several months. The cost of 
registration is equally eclectic throughout the Union. The registration 
usually has to be filed in the official language of the country the 
company is registered in163 and English is not always an option. The 
European country with the most efficient and inexpensive company 
registration procedures seems to be Denmark where online 
registration is possible and takes about 20 minutes. No registration 
fees are charged in Denmark.164 
b) Positions 
The majority of respondents to the 2007 Consultation considered 
registration an issue which should be dealt with in the EPC Statute 
and could not be left to the articles of association.165 The Law Society 
of England and Wales summarizes the essential point:166  
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“Whichever approach is adopted, it is important that the time 
taken to register the relevant company is not too long and that 
the information can be provided electronically and without the 
costs of having to notarise and translate documents. If there is 
certain basic information which it is felt must be available in the 
language of the host Member State in the local language, we 
would like to see this standardised and kept to a minimum.”  
 
The Commission has received similar comments in its 2007 
Consultation and points out that “administrative requirements should 
be kept a minimum. There should be no need for the notarisation of 
documents, to save costs. Registration should be able to be done 
electronically.”167 Schunk agrees: “the requirements for the 
incorporation must not be too strict.168 The European Parliament 
considers: the EPC “should be registered […] taking into account 
mechanisms for verifying the substantive correctness and authenticity 
of the constitutive instrument.”169 The draft Statute of the Paris 
Chamber of Commerce of 1997170 suggests the following wording: 
(Article 8) which seems overall acceptable:  
 
”1. The EPC shall be registered in the State of its registered 
office, in the register specified by the legislation in that State […] 
2. The registration formalities may be carried out by any person 
authorized by the founders for such purpose or appointed by the 
articles of association to represent the company in relation to 
third parties. For registration purposes, the following information 
shall be provided: the company's form and name, its duration if 
determined, the objects of the company, the address of the 
company's registered office, the amount of subscribed capital 
and the body or bodies having authority to enter into 
commitments to third parties for the company and to represent it 
before the Courts. The names and particulars of the persons 
appointed to such governing body or bodies shall also be 
specified.”  
c) Details of a preferable solution 
In my view, the EPC Statute should put a strong emphasis on 
promoting the flexibility, affordability and overall attractiveness of the 
EPC in particular by providing for a regime of formalities and 
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procedures of registration as simple, inexpensive and uniform as 
possible. The following seem to be the most important cornerstones: 
i) Administrative authority 
The existing national public authorities for the registration of 
companies and the administration of company registers, i.e. for 
example the English Registrar or the German Handelsregister, 
should also handle the registration of European Private 
Companies in their respective Member States. This avoids the 
establishment of new bureaucracy in the form of a new European 
registrar authority. 
ii) Uniform set of rules, documents and forms 
The Statute must regulate a standard set of rules governing the 
registration process in detail and in a uniform way throughout the 
European Union. This includes model documents and forms for 
the registration procedure. In addition to the Statute, standard 
written instructions for the formation and registration procedure 
should be provided.171 
iii) Form of registration and submission 
All relevant documents and forms shall be submitted in original 
form. There should be no requirement for any kind of notarization 
of documents; this is absolutely necessary for cost and time 
efficiency reasons. Instead, registration in written form should be 
acceptable as long as the standard forms have been properly 
used. It must then, however, be regulated that the respective 
national registrar authorities have to review and confirm the 
authenticity of submitted incorporation documents. Procedural 
details of this could be left to respective national legislation. 
Another medium term aim should be to allow for online 
submission of registration documents, although for the time being 
the technical requirements for proper online identification of 
persons are still under way. Furthermore: if it will be decided that 
the Statute’s model articles will exclusively have a model 
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function, not a residual function to fill contractual gaps (see above 
for details), then there has to be some kind of checklist for 
registration in order to ensure that the articles cover for all kind of 
mandatory matters. 
iv) Language, cost and time issues 
It is essential that the EPC Statute obliges all Member States to 
take the necessary steps to enable the respective national 
registrar authorities to accept registration documents and forms 
in English language. This would facilitate cross-border 
registrations significantly and save time and money of founders. 
Moreover, I believe the Statute should set a maximum time and a 
maximum fee for registration with the public registrar authority. 
Two weeks or one month after the documents have been 
submitted seems to be the longest sensible period of time.172 The 
costs of registration should not exceed € 500. 
C. Key Issue Group: Shareholders 
The following discussions regard the EPC’s shareholder structure, general 
meetings, resolutions and voting, minority shareholder protection and finally 
shareholders’ liability. 
1. Shareholder structure 
a) The problem 
It is discussed whether the EPC should be open to both, legal persons 
and natural persons, and if it should be open to single shareholders 
only, or equally to a group of multiple shareholders. The practical 
consideration behind these questions is essentially whether the EPC 
shall be established only by existing companies or groups of 
companies wishing to establish a subsidiary abroad, or whether it 
should be open to individual entrepreneurs as well. On the one hand, 
the EPC Statute would be shorter and simpler catering for a single, 
legal person shareholder only. This in turn would ensure a high 
degree of uniformity of the EPC in the Union. On the other hand, a 
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Statute not restricting the shareholder structure to single shareholders 
and legal persons would ensure a higher degree of flexibility as it 
would be open to all kinds of businesses. It must be pointed out that 
the multiple shareholder approach will clearly face greater political 
difficulties during the negotiation process regarding the EPC Statute.  
b) Positions 
The majority of respondents to the European Commission’s 2007 
Consultation support a single shareholder EPC, although according to 
most of them the company should be open to single and multiple 
shareholders, legal and natural persons alike.173 The European 
Parliament stated in its 2007 Resolution: “it should be possible for one 
or more natural or legal persons who do not necessarily reside in a 
Member State to establish a European Private Company (EPC) on 
Community territory.”174  
c) Comment 
I agree with the open approach, allowing one or more natural persons 
as shareholders, as well as legal persons. European small and 
medium-sized businesses are very diverse in structure, including 
notably a large number of businesses owned by single individuals, 
groups of individuals or partnerships. It is this group which, in my view, 
would make particularly frequent use of and would profit most from the 
possibility of establishing an EPC to conduct their cross-border 
business. This group is economically less powerful than the large 
groups of companies and can usually not afford the necessary 
armada of legal and tax advisors in order to design an appropriate 
cross-border strategy. In addition to that, allowing for only a single 
shareholder could easily be circumvented in practice anyway.175 The 
draft Statute of the Paris Chamber of Commerce of 1997176 suggests 
the following appropriate wording: ”A European Private Company 
("EPC") may be incorporated by one or more individuals or legal 
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entities, nationals of a Member-State or not, in the conditions and in 
the manner provided for under this Regulation.”  
2. General meeting, resolutions, voting 
The procedures of assembly and decision-making among the 
shareholders are important issues for any company including the EPC. 
a) The problem 
Examples of the main questions regarding shareholder assembly and 
decision-making are: How often shall regular general meetings take 
place? Who shall be extraordinarily allowed to summon the 
shareholders to assemble? What is the number of members that must 
be present in order to constitute valid meeting (quorum)? Which 
questions should require collective decisions of the shareholders? In 
what way can shareholder resolutions be taken, and what are the 
relevant voting procedures including the majorities for certain 
resolutions? 
b) Positions 
Holmquist suggests leaving all those questions to the model articles of 
association.177 The idea behind that seems to be that the meetings, 
resolutions and voting form exclusively part of the internal working of 
the company, as opposed to its external relations towards third 
parties. The majority of respondents to the European Commission’s 
2007 Consultation thinks differently and considered that the 
procedures for resolutions and voting must be dealt with in the EPC 
Statute and could not be left to the articles of association.178 The draft 
Statute of the Paris Chamber of Commerce of 1997179 leaves space 
for the articles of association and suggests the following provisions of 
the Statute regarding voting rights: (Article 15)  
 
”[…] the number of votes granted, for decisions taken collectively 
by the shareholders, to each share to which a voting right 
attaches [shall be determined]. Such number may vary according 
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to the nature of the decisions. […]The articles of association shall 
determine the decisions which must be taken collectively by the 
shareholders. They shall also provide for the required procedures 
and requirements, in particular as to the manner of consultation 
and requirements as to quorum and majority. […]”  
c) Preferable solution 
In my view, it needs to be differentiated between purely procedural 
issues and substantial matters that could possibly infringe the rights of  
minority shareholders or third parties, notably the company’s creditors. 
On the one hand, the formal and procedural issues, such as the form 
and dates of the regular meetings, the general quorum and other 
voting procedures should be left to contractual freedom as a rule. A 
comprehensive exemplary wording in the model articles with a 
residual function would be an appropriate solution here. This includes 
the overall decision on how powerful the general meeting shall be in a 
particular company, which questions should require collective 
decisions of shareholders and if shareholders could also use other 
means of communication in decision-making (mail, telephone, 
internet, email). On the other hand, shareholder resolutions that could 
potentially infringe the rights of minority shareholders or creditors must 
be regulated in the EPC Statute and not in the model articles. Ideally 
the Statute includes a catalogue of sensitive shareholder resolutions 
that require a mandatory qualified majority (for details on creditor 
protection and minority shareholder protection see below).  
3. Minority shareholder protection 
It has to be determined whether and how the rights of minority 
shareholders shall be protected by the EPC Statute. The options are the 
following. 
a) Contractual freedom 
One option could be to leave all matters related to minority 
shareholder protection to contractual freedom. This extremely liberal 
approach would, however, leave too much space for all kinds of 
abuses of a majority against the minority of shareholders. It would also 
potentially result in a wave of disputes between shareholders brought 
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in front of the national courts, a prospect that should be avoided 
against the background of the general overwork of judicial organs in 
the European Union. The protection of shareholder rights is essential 
to the proper working of every company because all shareholders, not 
only the majority, put their capital at risk, no matter how small the 
amount, and are entitled to protection against abuse.  
b) Comprehensive regulation 
A converse possibility would be to regulate the minority rights as 
exhaustively as possible. The majority of respondents to the European 
Commission’s 2007 Consultation considered minority rights an issue 
which should be dealt with solely in the Statute and could not be left to 
the articles of association.180 For the purpose of regulating minority 
rights one could take advantage of the fact that statutory laws and 
case laws of all Member States are so well developed and detailed on 
that matter. It could therefore be an option to draw upon those 
national laws and formulate a complete regime for the protection of 
minority shareholders in the EPC Statute as comprehensive as 
possible in order to avoid conflicts between shareholders from the 
very beginning of every company. However, this approach is hardly 
feasible. Firstly because the Statute will never be complete anyway, 
there will always be gaps which will lead to new problems. Secondly, a 
Statute trying to be comprehensive on that matter would be 
inconsistent with the objective to keep the Statute as simple and 
concise as possible. Moreover, the Statute would hardly be flexible 
anymore.  
c) Preferable solution 
An alternative for the Statute would be to be more limited in scope 
regarding minority rights of shareholders, but still regulate the 
essential cornerstones. De Kluiver convincingly suggested in his 
speech at the European Commission’s 2008 conference that the 
Statute “should lay down principles for a fair treatment of 
shareholders, without unduly restricting freedom to adopt structure 
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they deem fit, and a buy-out mechanism if they are unfairly 
prejudiced.”181 I agree with this approach and believe there should 
ideally be a general catalogue of protected minority rights. Dumitrascu 
summarizes a sensibly short list of the most important minority rights 
as follows:182 
 
• pre-emption rights of (minority) shareholders in case of capital 
increase or sale of shares, 
• shareholders’ right to call meetings or put items on agenda,  
• shareholders’ right to be informed on the company’s affairs, 
• shareholders’ right to challenge the board resolution, 
• right to impose legal action against directors, 
• sell-out rights. 
 
All those rights should be dealt with in the EPC Statute as a minimum 
standard. Further details could be left to contractual freedom and the 
model articles of association. An additional important issue to be 
regulated in the Statute is the protection of minority shareholders 
against an abusive behaviour of the majority by means of so-called 
minority blocking rights:  
d) Blocking rights 
The essential question is: Should there be a right for a minority of 
shareholders to block particularly sensitive decisions favoured by the 
majority? If so, in which cases should such blocking rights apply and 
what are their limits in order to in turn avoid abusive blocking by the 
minority?  
 
In my view, the issue of minority blocking rights is an example of an 
essential issue that needs to be regulated in the EPC Statute. The 
predominant reason for stipulating rules on blocking rights is to ensure 
the internal functioning of the company and avoid disputes and 
respective court action.  
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An extreme possibility would be to simply regulate a unanimity vote 
requirement for all resolutions adopted by the shareholders. 
Nowadays this approach is not frequently seen in private limited 
company laws; it is highly inflexible and favours the minority 
shareholders in an unjustified and inappropriate way and easily leads 
to a voting abuse by the minority.  An adequate solution needs to 
balance the risk of majority abuse against the converse risk of minority 
abuse.  
 
A more balanced solution in which a certain qualified majority vote is 
required for a catalogue of certain shareholder resolutions would be 
favourable. Ideally the Statute itself provides for a catalogue of 
mandatory situations in which a 2/3 or 3/4 majority is required. Such 
an approach would provide for a sensible minority protection. At the 
same time it provides for a substantial minimum threshold of minority 
voters to block decisions, thus preventing minority abuse. According to 
Dumitrascu the list of sensitive resolutions requiring for a certain 
majority vote could read as follows:183 
  
• important amendments to the articles of association (e.g. the 
main business object, headquarters, change of legal form), 
• share capital increase/decrease, 
• corporate restructuring, 
• winding up / liquidation. 
 
All other situations could be left to contractual freedom, i.e. the model 
articles. Moreover, Holmquist suggests that the model articles of 
association should include a default requirement of a three-quarter 
majority to alter those provisions of the articles which do not expressly 
require unanimity.184  
4. Shareholders’ liability 
Shareholders of a limited liability company are, as a rule, only liable for the 
company’s actions to the extent of their unpaid contributions. This principle 
is a vital element of the limited liability company’s success as a legal form 
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and its attractiveness to purely financial investors that are not ready to 
assume liabilities. However, throughout European jurisdictions there are 
statutory or case laws on the piercing of the corporate veil of non-liability in 
case of fraudulent or abusive behaviour on the side of the shareholders. It 
should be considered to include a selective and concise catalogue of 
piercing-of-the-veil cases patterned on the national laws regarding 
particularly severe cases. This could include certain cases of abusive 
undercapitalisation or cases in which a parent company as a majority 
shareholder exercises its powers to the detriment of the company. 
D. Key Issue Group: Share Capital of the EPC 
The question of the EPC’s share capital offers a whole range of legislative 
issues to be analysed and determined: minimum legal capital, shareholder 
contributions, shares and share classes, share transfer and restrictions. A few 
respondents to the European Commission’s 2007 Consultation thought that 
share capital issues could be left to the articles of association, at least in a 
single shareholder company.185 Unfortunately things are more difficult than 
that. The following aspects illustrate the complexness of this particular Key 
Issue. 
1. Minimum Legal Capital 
The minimum legal capital a private limited company disposes of is 
supposed to offer a minimum of protection to the company’s creditors in 
case of insolvency. It is also regarded as a token of seriousness and 
soundness of the investing founding members. It has to be determined by 
the EPC Statute whether the EPC should be obliged to have a certain 
minimum legal capital or not.  
a) Overview of national solutions 
Laws of the Member States of the European Union are very diverse in 
terms of the minimum capital of their private limited companies. The 
EU-wide average is about € 9000.186 Notably, the UK and Irish 
version, Private Limited Company (Ltd), does not require any 
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minimum legal capital at all. The German version, Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung (GmbH), has been requiring € 25.000 for the 
last decades. However, the necessity of a legal minimum capital has 
been increasingly disputed over the last years, with Germany currently 
reducing the minimum legal capital to € 10.000. Similar to the United 
States (Delaware Effect),187 European jurisdictions seem to be in a 
competition to attract investors by offering a low legal capital 
requirement. Must the EPC participate in this competition and would a 
symbolic capital amount of 1€ be sufficient, or is there a need for a 
higher minimum legal capital for the EPC? 
b) Positions 
The majority of respondents to the European Commission’s 2007 
Consultation considered the minimum legal capital a topic which 
should be dealt with in the EPC Statute and could not be left to the 
articles of association.188 Apart from that, the Commission has 
received comments that the minimum legal capital should be kept low, 
some respondents considered € 10.000 as a minimum189, other 
respondents thought that this amount was too high.190 Schunk 
considers: “The share capital must not be fixed at an amount that is 
unacceptable for SMEs. As a guideline a share capital of 25.000 Euro 
would seem appropriate.”191  
 
The European Parliament suggests a minimum capital of € 10.000 at 
the time of registration although this amount would not necessarily 
have to be paid up.192 The draft Statute of the Paris Chamber of 
Commerce of 1997193 proposes a minimum capital of € 25.000 which 
shall be subscribed for and paid in full at the time of registration. 
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Others suggest the EPC to require no minimum capital at all or a 
symbolic amount of € 1.194 
c) Comment 
It is the EPC Statute’s overall aim to enhance the growth of small and 
medium-sized businesses by providing for a sound and functional 
pan-European legal form. I believe, however, that the overall positive 
effects of a minimum legal capital in terms of creditor protection and 
evidence of soundness are overrated. Notably the effect of creditor 
protection is easily and frequently circumvented by withdrawing or 
otherwise annihilating the minimum capital after registration. 
Therefore, I do not see the necessity of a large amount of legal 
minimum capital, such as € 25.000. An effective creditor protection 
regime should rather be achieved, amongst other things, by provisions 
on the amount of permissible distribution (see below for details). An 
amount of € 25.000 is likely to hamper the emergence and the 
business of small and medium-sized enterprises rather than enhance 
it. The minimum capital needs to allow for all kinds of entrepreneurs, 
including founders of micro businesses, to establish a company with a 
very small amount of capital. This is particularly true for entrepreneurs 
in the new, formerly socialist Member States whose economic 
development is still weaker than in the rest of Europe.  
 
I take the view that the Statute should stipulate a minimum capital of 
€10.000. On the other hand, I believe that it would be 
counterproductive to require no minimum capital at all because one 
important benefit of a minimum capital is indeed the psychological 
threshold for entrepreneurs to prove an absolute minimum of 
soundness and seriousness. Also it prevents dysfunctional companies 
with no financial means from acting in the market. Investing a sum of 
€ 10.000 would be an appropriate proof of purpose.  
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2. Shareholder contributions 
There are several open questions with regards to shareholder 
contributions to the EPC. Should contributions be regulated in the Statute 
itself? What types of contributions shall be allowed? How should 
contributions be valuated? 
a) Statute or contractual freedom 
First of all, in my view, the issue of shareholder contributions as such 
cannot be left to contractual freedom. There should be provisions in 
the EPC Statute itself, not only in the model articles of association, on 
the kinds of contributions permitted and their valuation. The main 
reason for this is that the field of contributions is particularly sensitive 
with regards to the shareholders’ financial interests as well as creditor 
protection. A clear and comprehensive regime of shareholder 
contributions can prevent all kinds of long-term disputes between 
shareholders. It also mitigates the risk of manipulations regarding 
balance-sheet positions. Contributions are one of the areas in which 
corporate soundness and transparency are vital to the working of the 
entity. Of particular importance is the process of valuation of 
contributed assets which, in my view, should be regulated 
comprehensively by the Statute. 
b) Contribution methods allowed 
To keep the Statute as flexible as possible, contribution of money or in 
kind (property) should be generally allowed. The latter, however 
should require express permission by the articles of association. 
Beyond that, I do not believe a shareholder’s obligation to render 
services would be a suitable contribution. Contributions of services are 
simply very hard to valuate, their scope and quality are highly 
subjective and they are likely to produce disputes as well as legal 
problems in case of failure to perform. Therefore, the draft Statute of 
the Paris Chamber of Commerce of 1997195 convincingly suggests: 
”Share capital may be contributed in cash or in kind, but not in work or 
services.” 
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c) Time of contributions 
In order to enhance financial flexibility of the EPC and attract financial 
investors, the EPC Statute should not oblige shareholders to make 
their full contributions upon incorporation. On the other hand, a 
minimum amount of a quarter or a third of the contribution should be 
payable within a certain period of time upon express request by the 
company in order to facilitate its early business. The details of that 
could be left to the model articles of association. 
d) Valuation of contributions in kind 
As said before, the process of valuation of contributions in kind is of 
particular importance to avoid disputes between shareholders and 
achieve transparency for the company’s creditors. The EPC Statute 
should stipulate that the valuation of the property contributed must be 
made on the basis of an independent expert’s report. The draft Statute 
of the Paris Chamber of Commerce of 1997 on that issue suggests:  
 
“1. The articles of association shall contain a valuation of each 
contribution in kind. 2. Such valuation shall be performed on the 
basis of a report appended to the articles of association and 
drafted subject to his, her or its own responsibility by an expert 
authorized to perform the statutory review of accounts according 
to the legislation of each Member-State, […].”  
 
This seems to be an acceptable solution. Baums points out that he 
would not recommend to solve the problem of contributions in kind just 
by referring to the second Company Law Directive on capital raising 
and maintenance provisions for public companies, which he alleges to 
have certain flaws in terms of legal structure.196 He considers that it 
should be enough to hold the respective director responsible for the 
valuation liable in case of faulty valuations of contributions in kind. 
e) The problem of hidden contributions in kind 
So-called hidden contributions in kind are a widespread practice 
among founders and shareholders of companies in order to 
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circumvent the legal rules on shareholder contributions and capital 
maintenance. The procedure is as follows: at the stage of registration, 
a founder makes a properly valuated and audited contribution in kind, 
for example a car. At a later stage the founder, then shareholder, buys 
the car back from the company at a price lower than the market price 
without having audited the value of the car. Hidden contributions in 
kind should be treated as invalid contributions by the EPC Statute and 
the respective shareholder shall remain obliged to render his 
contribution. 
3. Shares and share classes 
Should the EPC Statute address the issue of shares, classes of shares 
and different rights attaching to shares or should there be complete 
contractual freedom for founders and shareholders in this respect? The 
majority of respondents to the European Commission’s 2007 Consultation 
considered these issues should be dealt with in the EPC Statute and could 
not be left to the articles of association.197 The European Parliament 
suggests in the Third Recommendation of its 2007 Resolution that “the 
capital stock of the EPC should be divided into shares with a specific 
nominal value; that members' shares should be rounded off to the nearest 
Euro.”198 This would be a concise and sufficient provision, in my view. 
I agree that the EPC Statute should only supply for the basic structure of 
EPC shares in order to ensure a minimum of standard uniformity as well 
as clarity for third parties.  
 
Beyond that, the Statute should leave contractual freedom regarding 
notably personal rights attached to certain classes of shares. These  
issues are at the very core of the internal structure of the company and 
can therefore be left to the discretion of the shareholders in order to make 
the EPC as flexible a legal form as possible. The risk of dysfunctional 
articles of association that do not provide for essential provisions can be 
prevented by including a comprehensive regime on classes of shares and 
different rights attaching to shares in the model articles. These model 
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articles would have a residual function and close any contractual gaps. 
They should also include provisions on alteration and cancellation of the 
rights related to the preferred shares and preferential rights of each 
individual shareholder creation of new classes of preferred shares and 
preferential rights. Moreover, the model articles need to elaborate on the 
options of certificated or dematerialised, register or bearer shares (or a 
combination thereof). 
4. Share transfer, transfer restrictions and pre-emption rights 
a) Governing law regarding the general transfer of shares 
First of all it must be pointed out that the law governing the day-to-day 
transfer of shares in the EPC will have to be the domestic civil law (or 
in some cases company law) regarding the transfer of securities and 
shares of companies in the Member State where the particular EPC is 
registered. The same applies to related issues, such as lien and 
usufruct that are similarly deeply rooted in the national civil law 
frameworks. Any conflicts of laws in these areas must be dealt with on 
grounds of International Private Law. This includes all kinds of 
potential restrictions on transfer that the national laws possibly provide 
for. Full uniformity regarding the transfer of shares is therefore not a 
feasible option. It is not the EPC Statute’s aim, nor would the EPC 
Statute be able to establish a new civil law or modify national civil laws 
or International Private Law on that matter. There is, however, one 
very important exception. The EPC Statute would be incomplete 
without a provision regulating that the transfer of shares in the EPC 
does not need to be notarized, but can be achieved by means of a 
written agreement. This is necessary to achieve the necessary degree 
of flexibility regarding the transfer of shares.  
b) Restrictions on transfer and pre-emption rights 
Restrictions on share transfer and pre-emption rights with regard to 
the corporate structure of a company are usually contractual 
instruments in order to allocate certain rights and duties 
corresponding to different underlying financial and political interests of 
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the shareholders. They can also be useful as a means to prevent a 
shareholder from selling his shares to an outside third party which 
could in certain cases be prejudicial to the joint corporate success. For 
example shareholders can ensure a certain long-term strategy 
regarding shareholder structure by a system of  transfer approval 
requirements and pre-emption rights as well as drag-along and tag-
along agreements.  
 
Just as with different share classes, the question of share 
transferability lies at the very core of internal shareholder organisation 
and should be left to their discretion. It is therefore not quite 
comprehensible, why half of the respondents to the European 
Commission’s 2007 Consultation considered this an issue which 
should be dealt with in the EPC Statute and only the other half thought 
this could be left to the articles of association.199 Holmquist proposes 
to leave all kinds of transfer restrictions (if any) to the model articles of 
association.200 I agree that the model articles with their residual 
function should propose a certain default regime regarding restricted 
transferability of shares. This includes notably a general provision on 
whether shares can only be transferred with the consent of the other 
shareholders as well as provisions on a right of first refusal, a right of 
first offer and put and call options. Moreover, the model articles should 
oblige a transferring shareholder to notify the company of the transfer. 
Furthermore, it would be favourable, if the model articles provided 
remedies for the event of refusal of a transfer. 
E. Key Issue Group: Management of the EPC 
The numerous issues related to the management of the future EPC are 
probably among the most important in terms of protection of shareholder value 
as well as creditor protection.  
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1. Overall management structure of the EPC 
a) National approaches 
Management structures of national private limited companies in the 
European Union vary significantly. They range from shareholder-
manager approaches where one or more shareholders themselves 
manage the company, to open shareholder and/or external manager 
structures (e.g. the French Société à Responabilité Limitée (SARL) or 
the German GmbH) where external or shareholder-managers are 
responsible for the day-to-day management and only certain matters 
are reserved to the shareholder assembly, and finally a one tier 
administrative board system like in the UK/Irish Ltd. 
b) Positions 
The draft Statute of the Paris Chamber of Commerce of 1997201 
suggests the following open wording leaving the issue to contractual 
freedom (Article 14): ”The articles of association shall determine the 
company's organization. In particular, they shall determine the manner 
of appointment, powers and terms of operation of the company's 
governing bodies, and the relationship between them.” Article 16 
suggests: “The company shall be represented in relation to third 
parties by one or more individuals or legal entities having full powers 
to act in all circumstances in the company's name.[…]” The European 
Parliament’s Resolution considers that the EPC Statute should require 
at least one responsible executive director, the rest could be left to 
contractual freedom.202 Holmquist agrees and suggests providing for a 
standard management structure in the model articles of association203 
c) Comment 
I take the view that there should be complete freedom as to the kind of 
management structure the shareholders would like to choose for their 
company with the exception of two necessary cornerstones that need 
to be regulated in the EPC-Statute. Firstly, as the European 
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Parliament points out, there must be at least one formal executive 
director responsible for the company’s business towards third parties 
and authorities. Secondly, only natural persons may be appointed 
directors, not legal persons which in turn would be able to claim the 
privilege of limited liability for themselves. The latter could inflict 
significant damage on the EPC’s public standing because it would 
result in an unacceptable intransparency of responsibilities and a 
doubling of limited liabilities. For a legal person acting as director with 
limited liability there would be no deterrent from acting recklessly.  
 
Apart from those two points there should be contractual freedom 
regarding the management structure. This would ensure a maximum 
of flexibility for the business. For example it should be possible for the 
EPC not to have a board but a single director. The Statute should also 
be flexible on the number of directors on a possible board. The 
potential lack of uniformity resulting from such contractual freedom is 
acceptable because the management structure as such is an issue 
predominantly concerning the internal working of the firm with only a 
few potential external effects. The model articles of association should 
propose a standard management structure that works as a default in 
case the actual articles fail to regulate the point properly. 
2. Nomination and eligibility of directors 
Moreover, the procedure of nomination of directors should be left to 
contractual freedom. This also reflects the majority view of respondents to 
the European Commission’s 2007 Consultation.204 The European 
Parliament points out that “the first executive directors should be 
appointed by decision of the members or in the articles of association.”205  
 
The eligibility of directors is a more sensitive point. In order to raise public 
confidence in certain legal forms company laws often prescribe a 
catalogue of disqualifying criteria for directors’ eligibility. On these 
grounds, courts are usually enabled to prohibit a person from running 
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companies. The majority of respondents to the European Commission’s 
2007 Consultation (and I agree) considered such prohibitive provisions 
necessary in the EPC Statute.206 The European Parliament summarizes 
the mandatory legislation which should provide “that no person who has 
been prohibited by decision of a court or administrative authority of a 
Member State from occupying a position comparable to that of executive 
director should assume or occupy that position.”207 
3. Powers of directors 
Most respondents to the European Commission’s 2007 Consultation 
thought that the powers of directors are an issue which should be dealt 
with in the EPC-Statute and could not be left to contractual freedom.208 It is 
indeed absolutely necessary to regulate the powers, notably the 
representative powers of directors towards third parties in the EPC-
Statute. Otherwise third parties dealing with the EPC would have to cope 
with uncertainty as to a particular director’s a powers and regarding the 
effectiveness of a certain director’s acts. This in turn could significantly 
damage the EPC’s public standing and cause a serious risk to it becoming 
a suitable and widespread instrument for cross-border business. But 
again, the Statute should only stipulate a minimum standard, notably the 
necessity of one or more executive directors to be registered with the 
company registrar and the scope of the director’s power to act.  
4. Duties of directors 
There is a wide range of duties the directors of national private limited 
companies in the European Union have to cope with. A common principle 
seems to be that the directors have to act with the diligence of a prudent 
businessman and in the best interest of the company.209  But what should 
the duties and liabilities of directors of an EPC be and what would be the 
most effective liability regime? Should the EPC Statute refer to national 
company laws or could the regime be left to contractual freedom?  
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a) Uniformity regarding directors’ duties 
The first question is whether directors’ duties should be regulated by 
the Statute, possibly including references to national company laws, 
or whether they can be left to the articles of association. 
i) Positions 
Half of the respondents to the European Commission’s 2007 
Consultation answered that directors’ duties are an issue which 
should be dealt with in the EPC-Statute, the other half 
considered this could be left to the articles of association.210 The 
European Parliament simply pledges for minimum standards 
concerning the duties of management vis-á-vis the company.211 
Holmquist suggests that the fiduciary duties of directors should 
be left to contractual freedom and that only minimum standards 
should be covered by the model articles of association annexed 
to the Statute.212 The draft Statute of the Paris Chamber of 
Commerce of 1997213 suggests the following hands-on wording 
(Article 16): ”[The directors] shall exercise such powers within the 
limits of the objects of the company, and subject to those matters 
in respect of which the Regulation or the articles of association 
require collective decisions by the shareholders.”  
ii) Comment  
(a) Contractual freedom 
Director’s duties are at the very core of corporate activity 
and governance. Directors essentially define the 
companies they represent by acting on their behalf. Any 
reckless or fraudulent act of a director can directly damage 
the company’s assets and standing and even third parties, 
notably creditors. Therefore, in my view, the regulation of 
directors’ duties cannot be left to the contractual freedom 
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of the founders, but must be governed by provisions in the 
EPC Statute. The founders are simply not the only ones 
holding a stake in sound corporate governance. Other 
shareholders’ and creditors’ rights can only effectively 
protected by means of mandatory provisions. And even 
the directors themselves will want to know exactly and 
without any room for uncertainty what their duties (and 
possible liabilities) are.214  
(b) Reference to national law 
Moreover, I do not believe that the EPC-Statute should 
refer to existing national laws on directors’ duties, however 
evolved and refined those national laws may be.215 The 
significant national differences would result in a high 
diversity of types of EPCs regarding director’s duties and 
an unacceptable lack of uniformity in a highly sensitive 
field. Particularly in terms of directors’ duties and powers 
the EPS needs a uniform face. Apart from that leaving the 
duties to national law would bring about considerable 
doubt and potential dispute regarding the question 
whether the applicable law shall be the law of the country 
in which the EPC has its registered office or its real seat 
and headquarters. These uncertainties are exactly what 
the EPC Statute is meant to prevent. 
b) Duties to be regulated 
There are essentially two different types of directors’ duties to be 
distinguished.216 Firstly, there are general or fiduciary duties regarding 
principles of running a company, e.g. the duty to act in the best 
interest of the company. And secondly, there are specific duties, e.g. 
to file certain company data with the registrar. 
i) General and fiduciary duties in the EPC Statute 
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The future EPC Statute must contain a definition of the directors’ 
fiduciary duties. I suggest basing that definition on the wording of 
the British Act on directors’ duties of 2006 obliging the directors 
to act “in the way most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of the shareholders”. In addition to that 
the EPC Statute should also adopt the concept of “enlightened 
shareholder value” and expect the directors to take other 
stakeholders’ interests, such as employees, customers and 
suppliers and even public interests, such as environmental 
protection, into account in their decisions. However, those 
stakeholder interests shall only be acknowledged by the law; the 
directors should nevertheless only be accountable to their 
shareholders, not to third parties.  
 
Furthermore, directors should have an obligation to act in 
accordance with the company’s articles of association. As to the 
applicable standard of care the Directors should be expected to 
be reasonable in the way that they carry out their duties. A 
principle of good faith should be enough when looking at all 
relevant pieces of information available and deciding what is best 
for the company. Moreover, directors with special qualification, 
e.g. in accounting, should be obliged to use their specific 
faculties when exercising their duties as director.217 
ii) Specific duties 
The following two specific duties should be considered for 
regulation as part of a catalogue in the EPC Statute in oder to 
ensure a minimum standard: 
(a) Conflicts of interest 
Directors of a company should not accept any benefits 
from third parties that could potentially affect their 
independence and integrity towards the company. 
Furthermore, there are certain transactions between the 
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company and a director that typically result in a conflict of 
interests. Ideally the EPC Statute provides for a catalogue 
of typical conflicts of interest that the directors need to 
avoid and provide for exact instructions on what is 
permissible and under what circumstances, e.g. which 
specific transactions between a director and the company 
need to be disclosed to the other directors and which 
conflicts the shareholders need to approve of.  
(b) Capital protection and wrongful trading 
Directors should be expressly obliged to take the objective 
of capital maintenance into account in their work; such a 
duty becomes even more important if the minimum legal 
capital for the EPC will be set at a symbolic € 1. As said 
before, the EPC Statute should also contain provisions on 
capital protection and wrongful trading as well as a duty to 
apply for insolvency proceedings according to the 
applicable national insolvency laws (see below for details). 
5. Directors’ liability for breach of duty 
a) General: regulation in the EPC Statute 
In my view, both, directors’ duties as well as directors’ liabilities in 
case of breach of duty must be coherently regulated in the EPC 
Statute as one inter-related matter and cannot be left to contractual 
freedom. This also reflects the majority view of respondents to the 
European Commission’s 2007 Consultation.218 Moreover, because of 
the mentioned differences in the Member States’ laws regarding 
directors’ liabilities, a reference to the national laws would result in an 
unacceptable lack of uniformity of the EPC. Ferrarini points out that a 
uniform regulation is also necessary in order to provide sufficient 
clarity for directors on the consequences of a potential breach of 
duty.219 For the mentioned reasons, the EPC Statute should be 
exempt of references to national laws. Ferrarini is furthermore a 
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supporter of a comprehensive regulation on directors’ liabilities taking 
the view that a simple listing of principle guidelines would not be 
enough. At the same time, he acknowledges that even the most 
comprehensive Statute will not be complete and there will be conflicts 
with national law and disputes brought in front of the courts.220 
b) Other positions regarding directors’ liabilities 
i) The Paris Chamber of Commerce draft 
The draft Statute of the Paris Chamber of Commerce of 1997221 
suggests the following wording: (Article 17):  
 
”1. The officer or officers of the EPC, appointed in 
accordance with Article 14, shall be liable, individually or 
jointly, to the company for actions in breach of the rules 
applicable to the company by virtue of Article 12 of this 
Regulation. They shall be liable, in the same manner, for 
breach of their duties and the standard of diligence 
reasonably required in the conduct of business. […] 3. De 
facto officers shall be treated as de jure officers as regards 
all obligations and liability to which the latter are subject.” 
ii) The European Parliament 
According to the European Parliament’s sixth Recommendation 
in its 2007 Resolution,222  
 
“the executive director or directors of the EPC must be 
liable either individually or jointly and severally vis-à-vis 
the company for all acts committed contrary to any 
provisions of civil and criminal law which are applicable to 
the company.”  
 
c) Comments regarding details of directors’ liabilities 
The most important issues regarding directors’ liabilities are, in my 
view, the question of joint and several liability, the limits of liability, the 
enforcement of negligence claims, and finally insurance matters.  
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i) Joint and several liability 
In most Member States of the European Union directors are 
jointly and severally liable for breach of an individual director’s 
duties, regardless of which of the individual directors actually 
caused the breach.223 One of the predominant reasons given for 
such joint and several liability is the fact that it causes each 
director to supervise his co-directors which leads to a system of 
monitoring or checks and balances among directors. Obviously 
the psychological disadvantage of that is a possible atmosphere 
of distrust. Legally it is arguable whether a director who acted in 
full accordance with his individual duties should be held 
responsible for other directors’ breach of duty. In my view, the 
EPC Statute should ideally find a well-balanced compromise on 
this. One appropriate solution seems to be to stipulate joint and 
several liability as a rule, but at the same time supply for a 
number of legal limits to liability: 
ii) Limits of liability 
(a) Business judgement rule / standard of review 
The primary instrument to limit liability should be the 
stipulation of a business judgement rule as a defence 
against negligence claims. The business judgement rule is 
a US-American case-law-derived concept whereby the 
directors of a company enjoy the privilege of the general 
presumption of being motivated in their conduct by a bona 
fide regard for the interest of the company. On those 
grounds a court will refrain from reviewing the directors’ 
acts in managing the company unless there is an 
allegation of breach of duty in bad faith. Holmquist asserts 
that it would be sufficient if the model articles of 
association annexed to the Statute included a business 
judgement rule.224 According to Ferrarini, and I agree, a 
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comprehensive EPC Statute would be incomplete without 
such business judgement rule.225  
(b) Ratification of breaches 
Another possibility that could be considered is the 
ratification of breaches by means of a shareholder 
resolution.  I, however, take the view that this would not be 
an appropriate way of limiting liability. As said before, 
there are other stakeholders (employees, creditors) who 
have an interest in directors’ duties and liabilities and 
potential claims on those grounds should not be decided 
over solely by the company’s shareholders ratifying a 
breach. 
(c) Allocation of duties among directors 
Another exculpatory instrument to limit liability would be a 
provision in the Statute that a director is released from 
joint and several liability if the particular director has not 
committed the breach himself and at the same time the 
director, which has acted, has done so according to a prior 
allocation of duties between several directors. 
(d) Statute of limitations 
The EPC Statute should also stipulate an appropriate 
statute of limitations. Negligence claims would ideally 
become time-barred after five years, starting on the day 
the breach of duty is committed. 
iii) Enforcement 
The question of who shall be allowed to enforce claims on 
grounds of managerial misconduct must also be dealt with by the 
EPC Statute. In my view, apart from the company itself, the 
shareholders should be allowed to become involved under 
certain conditions. The draft Statute of the Paris Chamber of 
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Commerce of 1997226 suggests a convincing conditionality 
regarding a minimum percentage of shareholders (Article 18): 
”Shareholders holding ten per cent at least of the capital or votes 
may, individually or together, bring action for reparation on behalf 
of the company against the officers.” Beyond that, I do not 
believe that creditors should be allowed to directly sue the 
directors. Creditors’ claims should be addressed solely to the 
company in order to keep the liability regime simple, concise and 
structured. 
iv) Insurance matters regarding directors’ liability 
The EPC should be legally permitted to reimburse directors for 
the cost of liability insurance (so-called D&O insurance) against 
any damages incurred from managerial misconduct. 
Furthermore, it is strongly advisable that the European 
Commission discusses the matter of directors’ liabilities with the 
insurance industry in order to make sure that the future EPC 
Statute does provide a regime that is practically insurable at a 
reasonable price. 
6. Employee participation at board level 
Laws on the extent of employee participation in companies’ management 
at board level are very diverse and not at all harmonized throughout the 
European Union. There are countries with a strong tradition of employee 
participation (e.g. Germany) and other countries where employee 
participation is more limited (e.g. the UK). In Germany, a number of 
employee representatives are granted membership at board level with all 
duties and liabilities of an ordinary board member, giving the employees 
significant influence in the corporate decision-making process.227  
 
According to Hoffmann, a European trade unionist, the main problem to be 
solved by the EPC Statute is how to prevent the undermining of national 
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employee rights regimes.228 The European Parliament expects that: “pre-
existing employee participation rights […] should be fully preserved, and 
whereas consequently the conversion of a company with employee co-
determination, information and consultation rights into an EPC should not 
result in the loss of those existing rights.”229  
 
The issue and its strong social connotation were already highly 
contentious in the lengthy negotiations on the European public limited 
company (SE). The political compromise achieved for the SE provides for 
a complex standard mechanism, through mutual agreement, information, 
consultation and sometimes participation, by which employees can 
influence management decisions in SEs with a certain size and under 
certain conditions. This regime is, however, not applicable to all kinds of 
SEs; particularly in cases where a national company is transformed into an 
SE, the existing employee participation rules in the relevant Member State 
retain their full applicability in order to prevent circumvention.  
 
The EPC Statute’s regulations on employee participation should 
essentially be patterened on the well-balanced SE model and ideally 
provide for additional differentiation regarding the size of business and the 
number of employees. Any other model is, in my view, politically 
inconceivable or would at least take considerably more time to negotiate. 
F. Key Issue Group: Creditor protection 
It goes without saying that creditors of companies are ideally entitled to 
protection from certain kinds of abusive corporate behaviour that could 
potentially put their claims at risk. Unlike the shareholders, the creditors have 
no direct means to exert influence on the company and its financial situation. 
The protection of creditors by company law encompasses a variety of aspects. 
The national rules on creditor protection in the Member States of the European 
Union vary significantly. Most continental European jurisdictions put the 
emphasis on a strict regime governing the maintenance of the registered share 
capital, while common law jurisdictions rather stress the protection of the 
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company’s liquidity by a regime of directors’ duties and liabilities towards the 
creditors.230 The majority of respondents to the European Commission’s 2007 
Consultation considered creditor protection an issue which should be dealt with 
in the EPC Statute and could not be left to the articles of association.231  
 
I agree that the EPC Statute should regulate creditor protection and cannot 
leave this issue as such to contractual freedom. However, the EPC Statute 
needs not offer a comprehensive and exhaustive regime of creditor protection. 
In my view, for designing the EPC a legal form as flexible as possible, the 
Statute should confine itself to selected sensitive issues where harmonization 
seems indispensable.232 The essential questions regarding creditor protection 
to be taken into account on European level seem to be the following. 
1. Headquarters and registered office 
An important point which the EPC Statute will have to determine with 
regards to creditor protection is whether an EPC shall be prohibited to 
have its headquarters and registered office in different Member States. In 
addition to creditor protection the reasons given for such a strict 
prescription are the need for a minimum of corporate transparency and the 
prevention of all kinds of abuses. It is also alleged that with headquarters 
and registered seat in different countries it could become difficult to 
determine the applicable company, insolvency or tax legislation. The (pre 
Überseering case) draft Statute of the Paris Chamber of Commerce of 
1997233 therefore suggests the following wording (Article 6): ”The 
registered office of the EPC shall be located within the Union. It shall 
correspond to the location of its central administration.” 
 
The European Parliament takes a similar stance in its 2007 Resolution: the 
“EPC should be registered in the country in which its seat is located, in the 
appropriate register, […] with a business address at which service may be 
validly effected […]”234The majority of respondents to the European 
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Commission’s 2007 Consultation disagreed and considered that the EPC 
should be able to have its headquarters and registered office in different 
Member States.235  
 
Drury correctly points out that after the European Court of Justice’s 
Überseering decision it is no longer legally mandatory for the EPC Status 
to stipulate that the entity’s registered office must correspond to the 
location of its central administration.236 Registered office and head office 
can now be located wherever commercial advantage dictates, although if 
there is a common set of rules governing the EPC throughout the Union 
there should be no real need to have these in different locations.  
 
I agree with the view that the EPC should be allowed to have its 
headquarters and registered office in different Member States in order to 
make it a truly European legal form. The European Union’s integration is 
advancing fast and unstoppable, particularly regarding the legal framework 
for any kind of commercial cross-border activity. It would therefore be an 
anachronistic move to re-establish long discarded borders in European 
corporate law. For the sake of future integration it must not make a 
difference if an EPC has its headquarters in Germany and its registered 
seat in Italy. Corporate transparency, the protection of creditors and the 
prevention of abuses are admittedly important policy aims, but those aims 
have to be achieved on other levels of European regulation.  
 
Notably the protection of creditors must be enhanced through other 
stipulations in the EPC Statute (see below for details) and an effective, 
supra-national cooperation in the field of justice, notably the cooperation of 
domestic courts and law enforcers on a European level. Any possible 
difficulties in determining the applicable legislation regarding an EPC can 
be avoided by approaching it formally and simply regulating that the 
legislation of the country in which the company is registered shall be 
applicable. It is argued that the free choice of location for headquarters will 
possibly lead to forum shopping, with a risk that companies opt for the 
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legal framework which is least protective of workers or creditors. However, 
this is another issue that needs to be addressed on a different level of 
legislation: the harmonisation of European domestic insolvency and 
worker protection law to a minimum standard. Forum shopping is simply a 
symbol of improper or lack of necessary integration. 
2. Transparency and public disclosures 
Public disclosure obligations are designed to promote corporate 
transparency and provide third parties, notably potential and actual 
creditors, with an insight into the company’s financial strength. It seems 
undisputed that the obligation to disclose important company related 
information needs to be catered for in the EPC Statute as a minimum 
standard for the protection of creditors and cannot be left to contractual 
freedom.237 Most respondents to the European Commission’s 2007 
Consultation agreed.238 The First, Fourth and Seventh European 
Company Law Directives harmonizing European company law already 
deal with a large number of relevant disclosure issues. A declaratory 
provision to the effect that the same Directives apply to the EPC as apply 
to other companies under the Directive, will therefore be adequate and 
sufficient on this issue. Among other things, the Directives include 
disclosure obligations as to the constitutional documents, the appointment 
and termination of directors, the amount of share capital subscribed, the 
balance sheet and profit and loss accounts. 
3. Specific directors’ duties 
As indicated before, capital maintenance and effective creditor protection 
also require for certain specific duties for company directors in the EPC 
Statute. These duties are nearly exclusively related to the potential risk of 
an insolvency which would pose a significant threat to the company’s 
assets and consequently to creditors’ claims. Methodologically the 
respective legal rules would be located on the borderline of company law 
and insolvency law. The following provisions, hand in hand with respective 
liability sanctions (see above), would be the minimum to discipline the 
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directors of an EPC in case of severe financial problems or an imminent 
insolvency. They should be included in the catalogue of directors’ duties: 
a) Director’s duty to file for insolvency procedures 
The most important and widespread concept to safeguard that in case 
of an insolvency early measures of creditor protection can be taken is 
the directors’ duty to file for insolvency procedures when insolvency is 
imminent.  
b) Wrongful trading regulation 
Wrongful trading regulations are traditional in common law 
jurisdictions. They provide for a directors’ duty to discontinue trading 
which will be triggered at the point at which the directors ought to 
know that there was no sensible reason to believe the company would 
avoid insolvency procedures. 
c) Shareholders’ meeting 
Moreover, the directors should be obliged to call a shareholders’ 
meeting in case the share capital is reduced to 50% of its original 
value. The shareholders must then decide on the appropriate 
measures to take. 
4. Distribution limits 
An effective creditor protection regime in the EPC Statute needs to include 
rules on the amount of permissible distribution. In general, distributions are 
only permissible as either dividends, or proceeds from capital reduction, or 
finally liquidation proceeds.  
a) Dividends 
The EPC Statute must provide for adequate legal requirements 
regarding distributions in the form of dividends. Apart from rules 
regarding the necessary majority of shareholder votes for the 
distribution, this includes rules on the financial permissibility of 
dividends. In my view, those rules should essentially refer to the 
Second Company Law Directive which stipulates that assets can only 
be distributed if the respective balance sheet test is positive, i.e. 
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dividends can only be paid out of the net profits or reserves after 
deduction of losses carried forward. In other words, after payment of 
the dividend, the company’s assets must still fully cover its liabilities. 
In addition to the balance sheet test a solvency test should be 
considered, determining if the company has enough liquid assets to 
pay a dividend. Furthermore, Dine suggests239 to oblige directors to 
issue a so-called “solvency certificate” confirming that the balance-
sheet and solvency tests have been properly executed; an incorrect 
certificate shall lead to a personal liability of the respective director. De 
Kluiver,240 however, points out that the regime must not be overly 
restrictive. 
b) Capital reduction 
Capital reductions are particularly sensitive in terms of creditor 
protection. Most European countries deal with the matter by means of 
strict procedural requirements for reducing a company’s capital. The 
same should apply to the EPC Statute which, against the background 
of creditor protection, cannot leave capital reductions to contractual 
freedom. An appropriate statutory procedure for capital reductions 
would include the requirement for a qualified majority resolution by the 
shareholders, the requirement to settle or secure third-party claims 
through collateralization, and the obligation to register the reduction 
with the respective registrar. There are essentially two alternative 
ways of regulating the details of capital reductions in the EPC Statute: 
i) Reference to Article 32 of the Second CLD 
The EPC Statute could deal with the details regarding capital 
reductions by referring to Article 32 of the Second Company Law 
Directive which provides for obligatory registration with the 
registrar and publication in the official gazette. Subsequent to 
these publications, according to the Directive, the creditors are 
granted a certain period of time to file for the collateralization of 
claims that were existent before the capital reduction took place.  
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ii) Reference to financial requirements for distribution 
However, Baums, considers that the reference to Article 32 of the 
Second Company Law Directive would not be ideal because 
creditors, employees and tort victims do not actually read the 
official gazettes regularly and therefore risk to be deprived of 
their right to collateralization of claims. Baums therefore suggests 
regulating the procedures for capital reduction in a completely 
different way. He proposes structuring the requirements 
analogous to those for distribution limits including a balance-
sheet test and an insolvency test (see above for details). I agree 
that this would be the most modern and appropriate way of 
regulating capital reductions. 
5. Subordination of shareholder loans to the company 
Another sensitive issue in terms of creditor protection regards shareholder 
loans to the company. Shareholders can finance their company by formal 
contributions (see above) or by other types of non-equity inputs, e.g. 
shareholder loans to the company (factual capital contribution). In some 
Member States of the European Union shareholder loans up to a certain 
amount are considered a substitution for company equity and are 
therefore subordinated claims in case of insolvency. This principle should 
be considered for the EPC as well, particularly if the EPC’s minimum legal 
capital is set at a very low or symbolic amount. On the other hand, the 
subordination of shareholder loans to the company would probably not be 
necessary if the EPC Statute offered an effective regime of other creditor 
protection measures including a wrongful trading clause. 
G. Key Issue Group: Duration, termination and dissolution of the company 
The duration, termination and dissolution of the company are issues that 
concern its internal structure and working, rather than its external relations. 
These issues should therefore be dealt with exclusively in the model articles of 
association. 241 Regarding dissolution in particular, Holmquist suggests that the 
model articles of association annexed to the Statute should require for a three-
                                            
241
 Holmquist, Presentation at the European Commission’s 2008 Conference, Closing Speech 
 
 
 
 
 104 
quarter majority resolution to dissolve the company.242 Furthermore, it is 
advisable that the EPC Statute provides for an alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) scheme in the model articles of association.243 
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VI. Relation of the reform process in South African to the European project 
 
The question this chapter seeks to answer is: What can European legislators 
learn from the ongoing company law reform in South Africa? The equally justified 
question regarding potential lessons from the European project for South African 
lawmakers surpasses the scope of this mini-thesis and must be left to another 
investigation. A close look at the South African company law reform and a 
comparison with the pan-European company project reveals a significant topical 
gap in the European discussion.  
 
Both, the South African reform and the European project put a strong emphasis 
on the legislative objective of enhancing the growth of both, small and medium-
sized businesses. The South African reform does so by differentiating and 
applying a different set of legislation to widely held companies as it does to 
closely held companies. The European project does so by modelling the EPC 
around the definition and the needs of small and medium-sized businesses. As 
explained before, the term “small and medium-sized businesses” encompasses a 
whole range of business types, very small ones as well as relatively large ones. 
The fact that small and medium-sized businesses account for 99,8%244 of all 
European companies illustrates how broad the concept really is. It also illustrates 
the importance of the EPC project. According to the European Commission’s 
definition245 (see above for more details) a medium-sized enterprise has less than 
250 employees and their annual turnover does not exceed € 50 million. Small 
enterprises have less than 50 employees and they have an annual turnover not 
exceeding € 10 million.  
 
A small enterprise is therefore a completely different business compared to a 
medium-sized business. However, this difference is currently simply ignored by 
European lawmakers, academics and practitioners who are busy drafting the 
EPC-Statute. Although flexibility is meant to be one of the key features of the EPC 
Statute, the lawmakers are presumably going to put forward a draft which does 
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not provide for any differentiation in terms of size of business. In this regard there 
is a lot to learn from the South African Companies Bill 2007. As said before, the 
Companies Bill 2007 offers a variety of provisions, forming a detailed and 
bespoke system of facilitations for closely held companies in order to specifically 
enhance the growth of smaller businesses. The European EPC should adapt the 
idea of differentiation between widely held and closely held companies. It  should 
provide a definition of closely held companies and widely held companies 
reflecting the fact that closely held companies are typically the preferred legal 
form for smaller companies as opposed to medium-size and large companies. 
This obviously would result in a reduced uniformity of the EPC as a legal form – 
an adverse effect which, in my view, would be made up for by a higher degree of 
necessary flexibility on the side of small businesses. On this basis the Statute 
should stipulate a series of necessary facilitations for closely held companies in 
order to be as flexible as possible. The following could be considered for 
regulation in the EPC Statute without being exhaustive: 
 
• A closely held company under the EPC Statute could be defined as a 
company whose shareholders are exclusively natural persons, and not 
legal persons. Alternatively it could be designed along the lines of the 
Companies Bill 2007 stipulating certain facilitations for companies all 
shares of which “are owned by one person, or by two or more related or 
inter-related persons” (see section 7 (3)). 
 
• The EPC Statute could overall leave even additional contractual 
freedoms to founders of closely held companies regarding certain Key 
Issues and provide increased flexibility for small businesses as opposed 
to medium-sized businesses.  
 
• The EPC Statute could require the widely held EPC to have a higher 
minimum legal capital than the closely held EPC. It could also under 
certain circumstances allow shareholder contributions in a closely held 
EPC to be delivered not only in cash or in kind, but also in the form of 
services. 
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• The EPC Statute could provide for a special regime and facilitations for 
closely held companies regarding shares, share classes and transfer 
restrictions. 
 
• The EPC Statute could notably facilitate a number of formalities with 
regards to the formation and registration of closely held companies as 
opposed to widely held companies. It could for example pattern on 
section 94(1)(a) of the Companies Bill 2007 and regulate that, unlike 
widely held EPCs, closely held EPCs are not obliged to keep a register of 
directors, auditors and secretaries. Moreover, similar to s15(1) of the 
Companies Bill 2007, the closely held company under the EPC Statute 
should not be required to file its articles of association for registration. 
Even the maximum costs for registration could be lower for closely held 
EPCs than for widely held EPCs. 
 
• The EPC Statute and/or the model articles could also facilitate a great 
number of procedural issues with regards to the internal workings of the 
EPC like for example section 80(1) of the Companies Bill 2007 does by 
means of a shortened period of notice in advance of shareholder 
meetings for closely held companies. 
 
• Like section 89(8)(a) of the Companies Bills the EPC Statute could 
provide for a simplified management structure and even make certain 
exceptions from the rules on the disqualification of directors. 
 
• On the other hand, an exemption for closely held companies under the 
EPC Statute from certain obligations regarding financial accountability 
like in section 7(3) of the Companies Bill 2007 regarding the application 
of sections 97 to 103 and 116 to 118 of the bill, will neither be possible, 
nor necessary because national laws in that field provide for sufficient 
differentiation and legal facilitations in terms of business size. 
 
• Finally it must be pointed out that a two-type system in the EPC Statute 
differentiating closely held and widely held companies would result in the 
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need to a different approach regarding the model articles of association. 
In line with the results of this investigation there would have to be three 
different types of model articles: two unambiguous models with a quasi-
regulatory residual function, one of them for the closely held and one of 
them for the widely held EPC and a third set of provisions with a purely 
model function catering for a range of alternative options and 
possibilities.  
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VII. Conclusion 
 
The legislative process regarding the Statute for a pan-European Private 
Company has left the phase of data-mining behind. Lawmakers of the European 
Commission, together with a small circle of legal practitioners and academics 
from across Europe, are currently paving the way for a first draft of the EPC 
Statute. They are doing this by collecting and discussing thoughts on the 
potential scope, structure and content of a future EPC Statute. From this 
discussion various pivotal Key Issues have emerged which can be systematized 
in several Key Issue Groups. All Key Issues and Key Issue Groups are more or 
less legally inter-related and form a complex patchwork of possible regulations 
and references.  
 
All that remains now is for this patchwork to be consolidated into one 
comprehensive and coherent solution, the most important cornerstones of which 
are suggested in this mini-thesis. The EPC Statute will notably have to be 
diligently drafted against the background of its main objective to enhance the 
growth of small and medium-sized businesses in Europe. In order for the EPC 
to become a true option for these businesses, the future Statute needs to put 
particular care and emphasis on two things. Firstly, it needs to be uniform 
throughout the European Union with regards to the statutory laws governing its 
structure. This means notably that the Statute must be exempt from references 
to national laws as far as possible. And secondly, the Statute needs to be as 
flexible as possible in terms of regulatory options and contractual freedom for 
founders and shareholders. In order to enhance flexibility in terms of company 
size, the EPC Statute should amongst other things follow the example of the 
South African Companies Bill 2007 and differentiate closely held EPCs and 
widely held EPCs. On this basis, the Statute should provide for a number of 
legal facilitations regarding closely held companies.  
 
Overall one can recommend that the EPC and its structure should be governed 
predominantly by the EPC Statute itself. References to national laws must only 
be made if legally indispensable (e.g. tax and accountancy matters) or politically 
not otherwise conceivable (e.g. employee participation). To a varying degree the 
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EPC Statute should, with regards to most of the Key Issues, only provide for the 
very basic structure and necessary minimum of regulation; further details should 
be left to contractual freedom and the model articles of association. Other Key 
Issues need to be regulated exhaustively in the Statute. There should be 
different versions of the model articles of association catering for different 
functions: firstly, an unambiguous default function filling potential regulatory 
gaps in the actual articles of association. Secondly, a pure model function in 
terms of a diversified toolbox of inspiration for founders and draftsmen. A 
functional linkage between the Statute’s basic structure for the EPC and the 
additional model articles of association will be crucial for a comprehensive and 
uniform regime with a maximum of flexibility for entrepreneurs. 
 
 
*** 
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